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The Origins, Purpose, and History of Comparative Statics 
This research was undertaken to develop some new theorems in comparative 
statics (CS), and some new applications analyzing the CS properties of specific models in 
several fields. The project was chosen partly with the aim of promoting wider knowledge 
of an under-appreciated method for CS analysis, described by its developer nearly 30 
years ago as " ... simply a better way to do comparative statics." 1 
Textbooks describe comparative statics in general as the analysis of the response 
of a system to a change in its parameters. Under the name of "sensitivity analysis," 
similar procedures are used in most disciplines which employ optimization techniques. In 
economics, the term usually refers to changes in the optimized value of an objective 
function and of its choice variables, most often in the presence of one or more 
constraints, in response to a change in the value of a parameter. 
Slutsky, a Russian statistician, was apparently the first to apply partial derivatives 
in this way as a tool of analysis to economic problems. His paper, recognized as seminal 
1 Silberberg, 1974 (1), p. 171. 
by most authorities, has been difficult to find in English until recently.2 Pareto, however, 
laid some of the groundwork using differentials several years earlier.3 Hotelling was 
using most of the tools of modern textbook comparative statics - partial derivatives, 
Lagrangian functions, solutions by Cramer's Rule, Jacobian determinants, bordered 
determinants, etc. - in the early 1930s,4 but he used them in an ad hoc fashion to make 
particular points, rather than as parts of a coherent theory. 
Hicks, acknowledging his debts to Slutsky and Pareto, may have been the first to 
employ the mathematical methods of CS as an essential part of a broad economic 
argument,5 but he did not use the term, and he relegated the mathematics to an appendix. 
In this regard, Samuelson noted that: 
Hicks, like [Marshall], has succeeded in keeping formidable mathematical 
analysis below the surface and locked up in appendices, thereby securing for his 
work a much wider audience than would otherwise be possible. This tour de force 
was made possible to a considerable degree by the repeated use of the already 
mentioned theorem relating to the demand for a group of commodities when all 
their prices change in the same proportion. 6 
When Samuelson's Foundations of Economic Analysis was published in 1947,7 
the use of the term "comparative statics" was taken for granted. Since the values of the 
variables of interest in economics are often the result of an optimization procedure 
2 Slutsky, 1915. 
3 Pareto, 1909, cited in Samuelson, 1983, p. 212n, and also in Hicks, 1946, p. 3. 
4 Hotelling, 1932, and Hotelling, 1935. The first occurrance of what is known today as 11Hotelling's 
Lemma II appears to be on p. 103 of the Collected Economic Articles .... 11 
5 In Value and Capital, first published in 1939, although the latter begins by expanding upon Hicks and 
Allen, 1934. 
6 Samuelson, 1983, p. 141. Samuelson is referring to Hicks' theorem that when the prices of all of a group 
of goods change proportionately, the demand for them behaves as if they were a single composite good. 
Samuelson refers to the first edition of Value and Capital. In the second edition, the theorem is Theorem 
10, pp. 312-313, the numbering of the theorems being somewhat different between the two editions. Hicks 
also notes the importance of the theorem and its extensive use in the text. It is worth noting that both Hicks 
and Hotelling used what amount to bordered Hessian determinants, without making reference to the 
matrices from which they are derived. 
7 The original version had been published earlier as the winner of the David A. Wells prize for the year 
1941-42. 
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believed to represent the economic concept of "equilibrium," Samuelson further explains 
the meaning as" ... the investigation of changes in a system from one position of 
equilibrium to another without regard to the transitional process involved in the 
adjustment. "8 (It is a central principle, however, of Samuelson's analysis that such 
changes can only be fully understood in terms of that "transitional process," i.e., the 
dynamics of the system.) 
Silberberg gives a much more technical definition ( emphasis in original): 
The logical simulation, usually with mathematics, of the testing of theories in 
economics is called the theory ofcomparative statics .... The use of the term 
comparative statics refers to the absence of a prediction about the rate of change 
ofvariables over time, as opposed to the direction of change .... Comparative 
statics is that mathematical technique by which an economic model is investigated 
to determine if refutable hypotheses are forthcoming. 9 
While he goes on to formalize and make rigorous this notion of "refutable 
hypotheses" as the fundamental criterion of what constitutes" ... theories [that] are useful 
in empirical science,"Io Silberberg means exactly what Samuelson meant 30 years earlier 
by the term, "meaningful theorems:" 
By a meaningful theorem I mean simply a hypothesis about empirical data which 
could conceivably be refuted, if only under ideal conditions. I I 
What we are concerned with is the source of such theorems or hypotheses. 
Samuelson stated the matter as if entirely obvious ( emphasis added): 
They proceed almost wholly from two types of very general hypotheses. The first 
is that the conditions of equilibrium are equivalent to the maximization 
(minimization) of some magnitude. I2 
8 Samuelson, 1983, p. 8. 
9 Silberberg, 1990, pp. 15-16. 
10 Silberberg, 1990, p. 13. 
11 Samuelson, 1983, p. 4. 
12 Samuelson, 1983, p. 5. The second type of hypothesis referred to is that the equilibrium is "stable," given 
the dynamic properties of the system. 
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Silberberg presents a formal argument to show that, under standard assumptions 
on the regularity of the functions involved, certain conditions on one or more of the 
"comparative statics derivatives" (the partial derivatives of the endogenous decision 
variables with respect to the parameters) are logically entailed by the behavioral 
assumption with which the process begins. These conditions, which may be relations 
between two or more of the derivatives, or simply restrictions on their signs, constitute 
hypotheses about events in the physical world which may or may not occur, and hence 
they are refutable. If these predictions of the CS process are contrary to empirical 
observation, the behavioral assumption must itself be false. 
As a result, this process can help us to choose between two theories (behavioral 
assumptions) as explanations of the behavior of an actual economic agent if they yield 
different predictions (entail different conditions on the CS derivatives). For example, 
Kalman and Intriligator present an example in which it is shown by means of CS that 
certain observable phenomena are consistent with a producer behaving according to the 
Baumol model (maximizing sales revenue subject to a profit constraint) but not with a 
producer maximizing profit according to the classical model, and vice-versa. 13 If 
phenomena inconsistent with one model (say model "B") and not those inconsistent with 
the other (say model "C") are observed in the case of an actual producer, it is inferred that 
this producer cannot be behaving according to model "B," but may be behaving 
according to model "C." Note that it can never be ''proved" that an agent is in fact 
behaving according to a given model, only that one is not so behaving: The hypotheses 
are refutable, but are supportable only in the sense of their not being refuted. 
13 Kalman and Intriligatgor, 1973. 
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Between Pareto and Silberberg, a number of other investigators made significant 
contributions to the theory and methodology, and also expanded and clarified its 
application to specific problems. Samuelson mentions, in addition to those above, W.E. 
Johnson, Rene Roy, Ronald Shephard, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, and others. 14 Of 
these, Shephard's contributions to the theory of duality in production are perhaps the best 
known and most widely cited today, 15 although Samuelson himself cites Hotelling (1932) 
as the inspiration for his own investigations of duality. 16 
Closely related to the CS derivatives, and intimately bound to the concept of 
duality, is the so-called "envelope theorem," which states that if a function is optimized 
for given values of the parameters and then the value of a parameter is changed by an 
infinitesimal amount, the change in the value of the original function is the same to the 
first order regardless of whether the decision variables are allowed to adjust to their 
optimum values for the new value of the parameter. The theorem originated, famously, in 
Jacob Viner's dispute with his draftsman Dr. Wong, a mathematician, over the relation 
between the long-run and short-run average cost curves of the firm. 17 In Samuelson's 
14 Samuelson, 1983, pp. 95,351,453, and elsewhere. 
15 Shephard, 1970. 
16 Samuelson, 1983, p. 453. 
17 cf. Silberberg, 1999, Silberberg, 1990 (p. 190), Viner, 1932. It is perhaps instructive that the correct 
relation was "seen" graphically by Wong, while Viner, one of the great economists of his day, was unable 
to understand why the envelope curve could not pass through the minimum points of the short-run curves. 
This despite the fact that Viner recognized that the long-run curve could never be above the short-run 
curve, and despite his inclusion of various related derivatives in his argument. According to Silberberg, 
Viner was fooled by the same two paradoxes noted in textbooks that still fool many students today. His 
intuition led him correctly to believe that the long-run curve should be an envelope to the short-run curves, 
but incorrectly to doubt that the slopes of the curves could be the same whether capital is fixed or variable. 
The greater paradox then and now, however, is that the minimum-cost output for any given plant can 
(almost) always be produced at lower cost by a slightly different plant, while the output that a given plant 
can produce at lower cost than any other possible plant is not the output that it can produce at minimum 
cost. It is this latter paradox that would not be apparent except for the mathematical analysis. 
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derivation of this theorem, 18 this important result, which never seems quite intuitive (at 
least if the authors of introductory microeconomics textbooks are to be believed) follows 
from the fact that at the optimum, the instantaneous rate of change of the objective 
function with respect to each of the decision variables is zero (the first-order condition for 
an optimum). In the formulation of CS to be discussed, it is seen to emerge directly as a 
part of the first-order conditions themselves. 
Duality 
The term "duality" takes on at least three distinct but related meanings, depending 
upon the context. In broadest terms, it has to do with the fact that there are two different 
formulations of any constrained optimization problem, both of which describe the same 
set of relations, such that the solution to one formulation is part of the other formulation 
and vice-versa. 
The context most familiar from all introductory microeconomics texts which 
employ calculus is that of the utility-maximization model. An objective function (of 
unspecified form) is optimized subject to a single equality constraint, consisting of a 
function of the choice variables and the parameters of the problem set equal to another 
parameter representing the "level" of the constraint. In this context, the primal constraint 
function becomes the objective function in the dual problem, and the primal objective 
function becomes the constraint function in the dual. The dual problem then is to 
determine the optimum value of the dual objective function (the primal constraint), 
18 Samuelson (1983), p. 34. Samuelson derives the theorem for the unconstrained case, noting only that a 
similar result entails for constrained optimization problems. 
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subject to the original (primal) objective function being fixed at a specified level (for sake 
of argument, the value found as the solution to the primal problem). 
If the primal problem is formulated as a maximization, the dual is in general 
formulated as a minimization, and vice-versa. For example, in the utility-maximization 
model the primal problem is to choose the levels of a vector of consumption goods so as 
to maximize the resulting utility given a specified budget, and given the prices of the 
goods. The dual is to choose the levels of the same vector of goods to minimize the 
expenditure necessary to provide a specified level of utility, given the same vector of 
prices. If the specified level of utility in the dual problem is the value found as the 
solution to the primal problem, the minimum expenditure found as the solution to the 
dual is the specified budget for the primal problem, and vice-versa. 
In practice, some problems require a certain amount of manipulation to get them 
into a form amenable to standard Lagrangian methods of optimization. In such cases, and 
perhaps in others, the features of the problem which require such manipulation may also 
require that the optimization in the dual problem be in the same direction as in the primal 
problem. Such an example is presented in Chapter N. 
The optimized value of either objective function is called its "value function," a 
function only of the parameters of the problem. In economics the value function is 
sometimes (but not always) referred to as the "indirect" function of the corresponding 
"direct" objective function. This indirect function is also sometimes referred to as the 
"dual function," insofar as important aspects of the duality relation are inherent in it. For 
example, Beattie and Taylor base their discussion of duality in production on the 
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optimized value of the function n = R(y,p)- C(x, w), subject toy =j{x). 19 They call this 
optimized value of n the "indirect profit function," whereas most books refer to it as "the 
profit function. 1120 Beattie and Taylor employ this "dual" function only as a simpler way 
to derive the supply and factor demand ( conditional and unconditional) equations than the 
"ground-up" method from the function above, which they refer to as the "direct" profit 
function. 
The true dualities in production, however, are more complex and can well be 
considered a context distinct from that above. The authoritative work on production 
theory is that by Shephard.21 Building on the approach of Samuelson,22 Shephard 
analyzes the duality between the cost and production "structures," and the relationship 
between the cost function and the revenue function by way of their respective dualities 
with "distance functions" of the input and output sets of the production function, rather 
than optimizing a profit function directly. (While Samuelson does refer to "profit 
maximization," he makes it quite clear that this involves merely the addition of the 
product of output, the essential features of which are already embodied in his analysis of 
cost, and output price - not necessarily given - to the negative of cost.) 
Varian develops the main results of Shephard's theory primarily in the familiar 
terms of vector calculus,23 whereas Shephard employs all the tools of modem 
mathematical analysis. Mas-Colell and Whinston develop duality theory for demand 
briefly, with the emphasis strongly in terms of sets and mappings. 24 In this context, the 
19 Beattie and Taylor, 1993, pp. 223-231. 
20 Varian, 1992, p. 25, Silberberg, 1990, p. 192. 
21 Shephard, 1970. 
22 Samuelson, 1983, 57-89. 
23 Varian, 1992, Ch. 1-6. 
24 Mas-Colell and Whinston, 1995, pp. 63-75. 
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variables in the primal and dual problems are not the same, but it has in common with the 
first context the fact that the solution set for the primal problem is part of the formulation 
of the dual, and vice-versa. 
Still more general is the context of mathematical programming (including but not 
limited to linear programming), in which multiple constraints are typical, both equality 
and inequality constraints are permitted, and restrictions on the signs of variables, the 
senses of the inequalities, and the correspondence between the number of variables and 
the number of constraints are relaxed. In the linear programming context, if the primal 
problem consists of m constraints in n variables, the dual consists of n constraints in m 
variables. The levels of the constraints in the primal problem become the coefficients of 
the variables in the objective function of the dual, and vice-versa, while the matrix of 
coefficients in the constraints of the dual problem is the transpose of that in the primal 
problem. Such problems are solved not by analytic methods but by iterative algorithms. 
This differences between this context and the others are obvious, although there 
appears to be no reason its general features could not be stated in the set-theoretic 
framework. (It is also homologous with certain parts of game theory.) Nevertheless it has 
in common with the first two contexts that the solutions to the primal and dual problems 
each imply a specific solution to the other (that is, an optimum value of the associated 
objective function, and the associated values of the choice variables). And under some 
broad assumptions that could come under the heading of !'regularity," the two objective 
functions - of different sets of variables - have the same value. Furthermore, Samuelson 
was able to show a deeper homology between the duality oflinear programming and that 
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of Newtonian calculus (the first context above), including the envelope theorem,25 as well 
as the related contexts in non-linear and dynamic programming.26 
The version of duality under consideration in this paper is primarily that of the 
first context, although the specific sense of "dual" in the term "Primal-Dual" is that of the 
"dual function," or "value function," the optimized value of the primal objective function, 
which is a function only of the parameters. In each model that follows, however, we will 
also analyze the dual problem (in the first context, and using the Primal-Dual method), 
because in all of these contexts the dual problem can lead to insights which are not 
readily available from the primal problem if they are available at all. 
Primal-Dual Analysis 
Samuelson yet again, in exploring the implications of a 1960 paper by 
Houthakker which examined additive utility functions and additive indirect utility 
functions, discovered that it was possible to derive useful theorems regarding functions of 
both quantities and price-income ratios by utilizing the difference between the direct (or 
"primal") and indirect ( or "dual") objective functions. He conjectured that this was "a 
technique that can be useful in a great number of more difficult problems, "27 that just 
mentioned being but one. 
The truth of this conjecture was later demonstrated by Silberberg.28 It is doubtful 
whether even Samuelson realized the full implications of his discovery at the time. For 
what Silberberg showed was that when any optimization problem is formulated in this 
25 Samuelson, 1983, Mathematical Appendix Cl. 
26 Samuelson, 1983, Mathematical Appendices C2 and C3. 
27 Samuelson, 1965, p. 781 
28 Silberberg, 1974 (1). 
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way,29 all the CS relations, and hence all the refutable hypotheses implied by 
maximization, are contained in the sign definiteness of the Hessian matrix of this 
"Primal-Dual" function with respect to the parameters. If there are constraints in the 
original problem, the matrix is the appropriate bordered Hessian. The summary below 
follows the slight reformulation published a few years later, 30 which clarified the 
mechanics of the process. 
Consider the problem, maximize a function j{x, a), where x is a vector of n 
decision variables and a is a vector of m parameters, subject to a vector of constraints 
g(x, a)= 0. The Lagrangian is formed as usual, its derivatives taken with respect to the 
decision variables and the Lagrange multipliers, and each derivative set equal to zero. If 
the necessary second-order conditions hold, the Implicit Function Theorem allows these n 
first-order conditions to be solved simultaneously for the optimum values of the variables 
x* as functions of the parameters a. When these values are substituted into the objective 
function, the result is the indirect objective function, or value function, ,X.. a) = j{x*( a), a). 
Now form a new function, z = F(x, a) = j{x, a) - ,X.. a). Silberberg calls this the 
"Primal-Dual objective function," to be maximized subject to g(x, a)= 0. Since ,X..a) is 
the maximum of j{x, a) for a given set of parameter values a, and subject to the 
constraint, F (which is a function of m + n independent variables} is non-positive, and has 
a maximum of zero whenx =x*. The first-order conditions of this function with respect 
to x are the first-order conditions of the original objective functionj{x, a) (subject to 
29 As the optimization of the difference between the objective function and its dual or "value function," that 
is, the function which represents the optimized value of the objective function as a function of its 
parameters. 
30 Silberberg, 1990, first edition 1978. 
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constraint), and the first-order conditions of this function with respect to a are the 
envelope results (also subject to constraint). 
The second-order conditions for maximization of Fare that the matrix of second 
partials of its Lagrangean be negative (semi) definite subject to constraint. This matrix 
can be written as the partitioned matrix 
It is easy to show from the definition of a negative ( semi) definite matrix ( as a 
product of the matrix with a vector satisfying the constraint) that if the entire matrix 
above is negative semi-definite subject to constraint, the matrix in the lower-right 
quadrant, consisting of partials with respect to the parameters only, is negative semi-
definite as well. Another way of expressing this condition is that the border-preserving 
principal minors of order k of the following bordered Hessian determinant have sign 
(-llorO: 
What do the terms in ~ * aa look like? By differentiating the first-order envelope 
results with respect to a, it can be shown that for values of x that maximize F and satisfy 
the constraint, each element of~* aa is an expression containing all the partial derivatives 
of x* and 'A.* with respect to <X_j, along with the cross partials of the original objective 
function and the constraint function with respect to the parameters and the decision 
variables. But these are all the relations we have involving the CS derivatives (the partial 
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derivatives of x; with respect to c;). Therefore it can be asserted that the negative (semi) 
definiteness of the above Hessian matrix captures all the refutable hypotheses implied by 
the maximization hypothesis. 
Note that this process does not necessarily generate expressions for the CS 
derivatives themselves, as does the conventional method using Cramer's Rule. In general, 
it does not. What it does do is to generate inequalities involving those derivatives, in fact, 
all such relations that follow from the maximization hypothesis alone, i.e., without any 
assumptions regarding the nature of the functions involved. 
Of course, this includes not only such simple relations as the lemmas of Shephard 
and Hotelling, but many complex relations which may be impossible to test empirically. 
Practical CS results emerge only when the form of the particular objective function under 
study (or special assumptions made with regard to it) produces simple, tractable 
expressions for some of the border-preserving principal minors of IH j. Fortunately, this is 
the case for many important economic models. 
At first glance it might seem as if the primal-dual approach (PD) is but a long and 
scenic route to a familiar destination. But this is not the case. Just as we do not have to go 
through the (perhaps interesting) process of inventing the digital computer each time we 
wish to type a paper, neither do we have to go through the derivation of PD each time we 
need to derive a CS result: The work has already been done for us, and PD stands as a 
tool, ready to use. Silberberg summarizes the advantages of the PD approach thus:3 1 
31 Silberberg, 197 4 (1 ), 171. 
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1. The derivation of comparative statics results is drastically simplified D one 
merely needs to calculate mechanically a certain matrix and various 
determinants associated with it. 
2. The common basis of the comparative statics results obtained in differing 
economic models is more clearly exhibited than in the older analysis. 
3. Through the effects of 1 and 2, the discovery of new theorems in 
comparative statics should be easier and the limits of the qualitative results 
that are obtainable in models involving a maximization format should be 
more easily delineated. It is simply a better way to do comparative statics 
analysis in economics. 
Current Research 
The theory of comparative statics is more or less fully developed at the present 
time. A recent search of the EconLit database found 828 items since 1969, with some 
duplications (sequences of working papers, journal articles later published in collective 
volumes, etc.). Searches of ABI/Inform Global and Archive turned up only a half dozen 
items not found in the EconLit search. Excluding titles with phrases such as "comparative 
statics of ... ," articles in which comparative statics was an aspect of the analysis of a 
particular model, general textbooks, etc., at most 30 could be considered contributions to 
basic theory. About one-third of these dealt with dynamic or stochastic models. About 
one-fourth dealt with "monotone" comparative statics, most of them building on a 1994 
article by Milgrom and Shannon which established conditions for the solution set of an 
optimization problem to be monotonic in the parameters, primarily in game theoretic and 
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programming contexts. No other single sub-topic generated more than four references, 
even obliquely; the remainder of the papers published dealt either with historic material 
or very narrow topics. 
Searches for keywords "primal" and "dual" found only 36 items on EconLit, but 
297 on ABI/Inform Global (since 1971). Virtually all of the papers in both cases dealt 
explicitly with mathematical programming problems, primarily linear. Only five papers 
mentioned Silberberg's or related methods. One of these was Currier's 2002 paper, 
"Long-run equilibrium in a monopolistically competitive industry. "32 The other four were 
all by Michael Caputo, a student of Silberberg's and one of the few who have used or 
referred to the Primal-Dual method in published works. Indeed, one of the four papers 
proves the superiority of the Primal-Dual method to another method put forth by Hatta,33 
and another playing on the title of Silberberg (1974 (1)) but referring to "comparative 
dynamics. "34 Both of the other papers employ primal-dual methodology in dynamic 
contexts, one theoretical, one in Caputo's specialty of resource economics. 35 
Plan of the Work 
What is simple in principle often turns out to be less so in practice. Even 
apparently simple models can generate quite complex expressions, many of which are 
difficult or impossible to interpret. Furthermore, models of apparently similar form can 
generate very different results. And sometimes a model which is susceptible to 
conventional analysis generates a bordered Hessian all of the border-preserving principal 
32 Currier, 2002. 
33 Caputo, 1999. 
34 Caputo, 1990 ( 1 ). 
35 Caputo, 1990 (2); Caputo, 1990 (3) 
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minor (BPPM) determinants of which are zero, meeting the second-order necessary 
condition for an optimum but not the sufficient condition, and providing few testable 
results. 
The analysis of the familiar utility-maximization model by the PD method in 
Chapter II was undertaken as an attempt to understand the structure of a model with this 
characteristic. The Safety Rule model of Lichtenberg and Zilberman is similar in 
structure to the utility-maximization model, in that it has no parameters in the objective 
function and four in the constraint, one of which is a level parameter.36 The fact that the 
latter is fully susceptible to PD analysis, generating all the standard results plus some 
novel ones, demonstrates that models with similar structures in terms of the arrangement 
of parameters in the objective function and the constraint (an important consideration in 
PD analysis) may generate entirely different CS results, depending on the particular form 
of the model and of its derivatives. 
The simple banking model analyzed in Chapter III, while not markedly more 
complex than the utility-maximization model, has two parameters in the objective 
function and two in the constraint, one of which is a level. It generates a number of 
interesting and plausible testable hypotheses, although many of the results depend on an 
assumption that the bank incurs monotonically increasing costs in the servicing of 
deposits. The results are compared with those from conventional CS analysis. 
The limit pricing model in Chapter IV cannot be analyzed by the usual 
Lagrangian method in the terms one would ordinarily expect for a monopoly situation. It 
36 Lichtenberg and Zilberman, 1988. 
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requires manipulation as mentioned above (p. 7) in order for its objective function to 
have an optimum without the use of an inequality constraint. 
Specifically, with the constraint that the potential entrant's profit equals zero, the 
incumbent's output has no minimum (the monopolist having ordinarily an incentive to 
restrict output): It is always possible in principle for the entrant to operate inefficiently 
and earn zero profit no matter how high the price becomes as a result of the incumbent's 
restricted output. There is, however, a maximum output for the incumbent at which 
satisfies the constraint, and graphical analysis shows that it is indeed this level of output 
that is desired. Any lower output would allow the entrant positive profit, while any higher 
output would lead to negative profit for the entrant under all circumstances, and to 
unnecessary reduction in the incumbent's monopoly profits. This inversion of the usual 
situation leads to an unexpected formulation of the dual problem as well. 
This model, like utility maximization, has no parameters in the objective function 
and two ( one a level) in the constraint. Its analysis, however, is at least as complex as that 
for utility maximization, and its results resemble those of the latter model only in a very 
broad sense. In both this model and the Safety Rule model, the pristine symmetry of the 
utility-maximization model is absent, and both contain functions of the variables of 
unspecified form (including probabilistic functions in the Safety Rule model) which are 
absent from the utility-maximization model. It is not surprising in retrospect that these 
differences prevail completely over the similarities in terms of the arrangement of the 
parameters. While it is true as Silberberg maintains that the arrangement of the 
parameters has profound consequences for duality, these consequences are no less 
profound than those proceeding from the forms of the functions themselves. 
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Chapter V considers the conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of these 
models, and possibilities for further work. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE FAMILIAR UTILITY MAXIMIZATION 
MODEL AND AN EXTENSION 
The elementary utility maximization model with two goods and a budget 
constraint illustrates the differences between the results of conventional CS analysis and 
those of PD analysis. In the standard treatment the first-order conditions (FOC) provide 
the result that at the point of optimality the ratio of the marginal utility of a good to its 
price is the same for both goods (for all goods in the extended model). The FOC are 
totally differentiated and the differentials of the quantities of the goods and of the 
Lagrange multiplier are found by Cramer's Rule. These are then divided by the 
differentials of prices and income to generate the standard CS derivatives, which are the 
partials of the quantity of each good purchased at the point of optimality with respect to 
its own price, to the price of the other good, and to income. 
As such, these derivatives are of little use, because their arguments include the 
unobservable second partials of utility, (although assumptions regarding the signs of 
those partials, corresponding to specific economic assumptions, can specify the signs of 
some of the CS derivatives). But most important for consumer theory are the various 
relations among these derivatives and those arising from the dual problem ( expenditure 
minimization given a fixed level of utility), which relations are themselves consequences 
of duality, along with certain characteristics of the functions involved. 
19 
Primal-dual (PD) analysis, on the other hand, generates those familiar relations 
(and often others) more or less directly, by taking duality as its starting point, without 
generating the standard CS derivatives at all. The standard derivatives are taken with 
respect to the parameters, but they typically have among their arguments derivatives of 
the objective function with respect to the decision variables. It is those derivatives which 
are absent from PD analysis, and hence from any expressions for the standard CS 
derivatives which may emerge when the fundamental primal-dual relations happen to 
simplify in particular ways. 
The PD method is developed in the context of the Envelope Theorem, which has 
to do with the (partial) derivative of an objective function with respect to a parameter 
("parameterized optimization"). Envelope relations in this sense do not exist for 
parameters which appear in a constraint, because such relations rest upon fixing the 
decision variables at their optimum values for some given values of the parameters, then 
varying the parameters. But for parameters which enter the constraint this is not possible: 
When a constraint parameter is varied, the previously determined values for the decision 
variables are then in violation of the constraint, a problem which does not arise for 
parameters which do not appear in a constraint. 
On the other hand, the PD formulation of this problem reveals directly certain 
characteristics of the functions involved which must be proved ad hoc in the conventional 
development. If we maximize U(x1, x2) s. t. p1x1 + p2x2 = M, the result - the value 
function- is the indirect utility function, v(p1,P2, M). Ifwe then set up the PD problem, 
max U(x1, x2) - v(p1, p2, M) s. t. p1x1 + p2x2 = M 
by forming the PD Lagrangian, 
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we see that all the derivatives of U(x1, x2) with respect to the parameters, which are the 
only derivatives of concern in this method, are zero. Thus the problem is in effect to 
minimize the indirect utility function, subject to the constraint. Therefore, if the 
assumptions are met that guarantee the existence of a maximum of the original objective 
function, the indirect function must be convex in the parameters (subject to the 
constraint). The linearity of the constraint in the parameters then means that the indirect 
utility function is quasi-convex in the parameters. 1 This familiar element of consumer 
theory is thus shown to emerge directly from the mathematical structure of the problem.2 
Differentiating the PD Lagrangian yields the first-order conditions (FOC) with 
respect to the parameters of the form ;;£* a = 0: 
In an unconstrained model with parameters in the primal objective function, these 
would be the envelope relations between the derivatives of the direct and indirect 
functions with respect to the parameters. In a model with constraints which also include 
those parameters, the relations would be between the derivatives of the indirect function 
and those of the Lagrangian of the direct function. In this model, with parameters in the 
constraint only, these relations are between the derivatives of the indirect function and 
those of the constraint (including the multiplier): They do not involve the (direct) 
1 Silberberg, Structure, p. 202; cf. Chiang, pp. 351, 396-399. 
2 See, for example, Varian, p. 102. 
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objective function at all, even in the limit, and thus are not envelope relations in the usual 
sense. Nevertheless they play an important part in the analysis, and will be referred to 
herein as "pseudo-envelope" relations. 
In the third of these relations, the interpretation of the Lagrange multiplier as the 
"Marginal Utility of Money" (MUM) is direct and obvious compared to the standard 
derivation. The first two relations correspond directly to the FOC of the primal problem, 
which say that the change in optimum utility in response to a change in the quantity 
chosen of a good is equal to the MUM times the price of the good. These say that the 
change in optimum utility in response to a change in the price of a good is equal to the 
negative of the MUM times the quantity chosen of the good. (More of the good~ more 
utility; higher price~ less utility.) 
To obtain the second partials$£* aa. of the PD Lagrangian, we note that in general 
(i.e., with the $£* a not restricted to equal zero) the only argument of the $£* a that depends 
on the parameters is v. Then by inspection, we see that the second partials $£* aa are 
simply the negatives of Vaa· To calculate these derivatives, we differentiate the "pseudo-
envelope" identities above: 
$£*p1p1 = -Vp1p1 = 11, *(8x1 */Bpi)+ x1*(81. */Bp1) 
$£* p1p2 = -Vp1p2 = 11, *(Bx1 */Bp2) + x1 *(811, */Bp2) 
$£*p1M= -Vp1M = A *(Bx1*IBM) + x1*(81. *IBM) 
$£* p2p1 = -Vp2p1 = A *(Bx2*!8p1) + x2*(811, */Bpi) 
$£* p2p2 = -Vp2p2 = 11, *(Bx2*/Bp2) + x2*(811, *!Bp2) 
$£* piM = -Vp1M = 11, *(Bx2*!8M) + x2*(811, *IBM) 
$£*Mp! =-VMpt =-81.*/Bp1 
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~*Mp2 =-VMp2 = -8/1. */8p2 
~*MM=-VMM=-8/1. *IBM 
Three relations follow from the symmetry of the cross partials: 
8A */Bpi =-A *(8x//8M)-x/(8A *IBM) 
-A *(8x1 */8p2) -x1 *(8A */8p2) = -A *(8x2*!8p1) -x2*(8A */8p1) 
The first pair of relations say that the response of MUM to a change in the price 
of one good (with income and all other prices held constant) is equal and opposite to the 
response of the product of the quantity chosen of that good with MUM to a change in 
income. This is of some interest: When the price of a good increases with income held 
constant, MUM must decrease because an additional dollar then purchases less utility 
than before. On the other side of the equation, the amount of a normal good purchased 
increases with an increase in income, while MUM decreases if marginal utility is 
diminishing. This relation ( actually a set of relations, one for each choice variable) is 
"almost patentable:" It is novel, and it is non-obvious. Unfortunately, since it involves not 
only the MUM itself but its derivatives, it is not clear that it is useful. 
The last relation is of the general form derived by Silberberg for reciprocity 
relations.3 It says that the response of the product of MUM and the quantity chosen of 
one good in response to a change in the price of the other good is equal to that for the 
opposite combination. This, too, is non'."obvious, though intuitively attractive because of 
its symmetry. The problem again is that it is not clear how one might apply it given the 
prominence of A, which is unobservable, and its derivatives. One way around this 
problem is to combine the relations in such a way that the A's cancel out, and indeed the 
3 Silberberg, Structure, p. 214, equation (7-44). 
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"cross-price relation" follows immediately from the symmetrical reciprocity relation, or 
from the quotient of the first pair, if 'A.* is assumed to be constant. 
While these relations may simply reveal the structure underlying the "obvious" 
(Bx1*/Bp2) = (Bx2*/Bp1), they seem to suggest something a little more profound and 
unexpected. If each of the "money pair" is divided by-B'A. */Bpi, the "A's are not eliminated, 
but we get the tantalizing relation 
If one of the "money pair" is subtracted from the other, we get 
- (B'A. */Bp2 - B'A. */Bp2) = 'A. *(Bx1*!0M - Bx2*/BM) + (x1 * -x2*)(B'A. *IBM) 
While each of these looks like something that should have a name, both are still heavily 
dependent on the unobservable A and its derivatives. Furthermore, the expression 
x1 * -x2* literally represents "apples minus oranges," so the significance (if any) of these 
relations is unclear, and they are certainly not testable as they stand. 
Next we form the bordered Hessian matrix ~*cux of the second partials of the PD 
function with respect to the parameters, whose elements are the ~* aa above: 
1.( ax: J + x,'( a1· J 1-( ax,' J+ x,'( a1· J 1-( ax,' J +x -( a1· J • -x1 
Bpi BA Bp2 °P2 BM 1 8M 
~* = 1.( ax; J + x;( 01· J A°( ax; J+x;( a1· J 1·( ax; J +x -( BA' J • aa -x2 
8A 8A 8p2 8p2 8M 2 8M 
B'A.* 8'A.* B'A.* 
1 
8pl BPz 8M 
• • 1 0 -x1 -x2 
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The sufficient second-order condition for (x1 *, x2*) to be a maximum is that this 
matrix be negative definite, in which case the principal minors of order k have sign (-1 f 
Assuming this condition is met, eliminating the third row and column yields 
A *(8x1*/8p1) + x1*(8A */8p1) 
A *(8x2*/8p1) + x2*(8A */8p1) 
-x1* 
A *(8x1 */8p2) + x1 *(BA */8p2) 
A *(8x2*!8p2) + x2*(8A */8p2) 
-x2* 
x1 *x2*[A *(8x1 */8p2) + x1*(8A */8p2)] -x1 *2[A *(8x2*/8p2) + x2*(8A */8p2)] 
-x2*2[A *(8x1*!8p1) + x1*(8A */8p1)] + x1*x2*[A *(8x2*/8p1) + x2*(8A */8p1)] > 0 
And since A* > 0, 
This relation says that the sum of the cross-price effects, multiplied by the product 
of the chosen quantities of the two goods, is greater than the sum of the own-price effects 
(the slopes of the Marshallian demand curves), each multiplied by the square of the 
chosen quantity of the other good. Since this relation involves no unobservable 
quantities, it is in principle a testable hypothesis and apparently new. It is plausible but 
not obviously true, and it does not arise mechanically from the standard analysis. 4 That its 
significance also is not obvious does not necessarily mean that it is not significant, or that 
the comparable relation in a model with similar structure might not be. In any case, it 
demonstrates the power of the PD method to reveal relationships of potential significance 
which conventional comparative statics analysis may overlook. 
4 For example, Varian, Chapters 7 and 8; Henderson and Quandt, Chapter 2. 
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Eliminating the second row and column yields 











+ X1 *[ X1 *(o"A *loM)- A *(8x1 */8M)-x1 *(o"A *IBM)]> 0 
The final order-2 determinant is similar in x2, p 2 , yielding 
A *[8x2*!8p2 + x2(8x2*18M)] < 0 
MUM = A* > 0, so we have the result 
ox/lopi + xi(ox/loM) < 0 
But this is just the substitution effect, because the left side is the slope of the 
compensated demand function, which is always negative. So PD analysis provides no 
new information in this case, but could provide a route to a useful result for other models 
with a similar structure. 
The order-3 principal minor expands to a very complex expression which cannot 
be simplified, and which is not likely to have any economic interpretation. No "conjugate 
pairs" relations are generated, because they arise from the envelope relations. Therefore, 
the above constitute all the results obtainable from this model by PD analysis, which 
Silberberg claims to be all the refutable hypotheses that follow from the maximization 
hypothesis alone. 
Some additional results emerge, however, when PD method is applied to the dual 
problem of minimizing expenditure given a fixed level of utility: 
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e(p1,P2, U) = min (p1x1 + p2x2) s.t. U(x1,x2) = tJ 
The PD formulation is 
min p1x1 + p2x2 - e(p1,P2, tJ) s.t. U(x1,x2) = tJ 
The PD Lagrangian is 
$£* =p1x1 + p2x2 - e(p1,P2, U) + µ[tJ - U(x1,x2)] 
The FOC with respect to the parameters are: 
$£*u = µ- eu= 0 ~ eu= µ* 
In these relations, the x/ are the compensated (Hicksian) demands, henceforth 
designated h/ (although the compensated demands are usually assumed to be optimized). 
The first two relations on the right are true envelope relations, because the 
parameters p 1 and p2 appear in the objective function, and h1 * and h2* are the derivatives 
of the objective function with respect to those parameters, evaluated at the point of 
optimality. We still cannot, however, derive meaningful conjugate pairs relations from 
these envelope identities, because as derivatives of the objective function h1* and h2* are 
degenerate, functions only of themselves and thus of the parameters directly. The 
conjugate pairs relations depend on the first derivatives of the objective function with 
respect to a parameter in the function being expressible as functions of all the arguments 
of the objective function, which are then expressed as functions of the parameters at the 
point of optimality. These first two relations say that the change in the minimum 
necessary expenditure in response to a change in the price of a good is equal to the 
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quantity of the good chosen at the point of optimality. This is a novel result, which should 
be easy to derive by conventional methods, but which is not found in standard texts. 
The third relation says that the change in expenditure in response to a change in 
the given level of utility is equal to the value of the (dual) Lagrange multiplier at the 
optimum, which is as usual the reciprocal of that in the primal problem. (Perhaps it 
should be called the "marginal money of utility," the additional increment of expenditure 
necessary to obtain an additional unit of utility.) 
In order to form the SOC we need the second derivatives of the Lagrangian: 
~*uu=-euu* =-µu* 
CO* - e * - II * el. Up; - - Up; - -,..,p; 
The symmetry of the cross partials yields the unsurprising cross-price relation, 
co* = -8h·*/81n- = -8h·*/81n- = co* el. p; pi I rJ J r I el. pip; 
But symmetry also yields the following pair, which appear to be new: 
These correspond roughly to the pair of novel asymmetric relations for the primal 
problem, and are also reciprocity relations.5 They can be interpreted as meaning that the 
response of the quantity purchased of good i to a change in the specified level of utility is 
equal to the response of the "marginal money of utility" to a change in the price of good i. 
Such relations are not of practical use, as the only observable quantity is the price. But 
5 See Currier's Theorem 5-3B, p. 87. 
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they are of theoretical interest insofar as they provide an additional and unusual window 
into the structure of this familiar model. 
The bordered Hessian matrix ~* cm will be positive definite (the sufficient 
condition), since this is a minimization problem, which means that all the border-
preserving principal minors will be negative: 
[-8h1*!8p1 -8h1*!8p2 -8h1*!8tJ 
!J 
-8h2*!8p1 -8h2*!8p2 -8h2*!8tJ 
~*cm= ~8µ*/8p1 -8µ*/8p2 -aµ*!atJ 
0 1 
We have 2 minors of order 2: 
-8ht*l8Pi -Bht*/8(] 0 
-8µ*/8pi -aµ*1atJ 1 = 8ht*/8pi < 0 
0 1 0 
That is simply to say that the compensated demand is always downward-sloping. 











- [(8h1*/8p1)(8h2*/8p2)- (8h2*!8p1)(8h1*!8p2)] < 0 
(8h1*!8p1)(8h2*!8p2) > (8h2*!8p1)(8h1*!8p2) = (8h2*!8p1)2 = (8h1*!8p2)2 
This relation says that the product of the compensated own-price effects is greater 
than the product of the compensated cross-price effects (which is equal to the square of 
either one, since they were shown above to be equal). While not testable due to the 
unobservability of the compensated demands, this relation does not emerge readily from 
conventional analysis and does not appear to have been noted previously. 
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We would have serious reservations about a novel analytical method if it failed to 
lead to universally accepted general consequences of a well-understood problem. For this 
problem, Roy's identity and the Slutsky equation should follow directly from the above 
results, and they do. Both are consequences of the FOC of the PD Lagrangian. 
From the primal problem we have (p. 20, above) 
~* p; = -Mi - v p; = 0 => Vp; = -A *x/ 
~*M= 11.-vM= 0 => VM= 11.* 
Dividing the first relation by the second yields Roy's identity, 
(8v/8pi)/(8v/8M) = -x/. 
The Slutsky equation follows as always from the identity of the optimizing bundle 
for the primal and dual problems, 
h/(p1,P2, tJ) =x/(p1,P2, e(p1,P2, tJ)) 
Differentiating with respect to pj, 
8h/!8pj = 8x//8pj + (8x/!8M)(8el8pj). 
But from the FOC for the dual problem (p. 26, above), 8e/8pj = h/, so rearranging 
the preceding relation and substituting yields the Slutsky equation, 
8x//8pj = 8h/!8pj-x/(8x//8M). 
Analyzing the primal and dual problems simultaneously should make general 
conclusions stand out, while tending to suppress intermediate results. Specifying the form 
or changing the arguments of the objective function can be expected to produce different 
results, or at least results that differ in appearance. For example, a quasi-linear utility 
function is sometimes specified in this problem just because the demand functions in that 
case have particularly striking characteristics. PD analysis does generate some novel 
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relations in that case, but they can be interpreted only in light of the conventional results, 
which do not emerge from the PD formulation. Such relations as are generated seem less 
significant than those from the conventional analysis, which are derived ad hoc. 
Suppose on the other hand that prices enter the utility function. This situation is 
sometimes dismissed as a strictly academic exercise. Persons not fully convinced by 
Friedman's "Positive Economics" may consider such a situation to be unrealistic despite 
anecdotal suggestions. For example, a man was heard to crow over having bought a new 
$50,000 Cadillac (which he could well afford but had not intended to buy) because he 
was able to save over $10,000 in financing costs due to incentives offered by auto 
manufacturers in the fall of 2001. But since utility is not observable, we cannot say 
whether he actually valued the car more highly for this reason, or whether he simply 
moved down his demand curve in response to the lower effective price to the point at 
which his demand for Cadillacs rose to a quantity of 1. 
What about people whose budget constraint is relatively severe? Is the 
satisfaction they derive from a given quantity of a particular good determined solely by 
the quantities of the various goods they consume, or do they actually get more 
satisfaction (or possibly less) from consuming a good obtained at a low price than they 
would from consuming the same quantity of the same good if the price were higher? We 
usually assume that their preference would be to consume the cheaper good, so that they 
might then be able to consume more of some other good, given the same budget. But 
again, the premise is that we cannot tell by observing their behavior. On the other hand, 
the present writer is a self-proclaimed cheapskate, and unless we would assert that one's 
subjective report regarding one's own utility function is also irrelevant, we are forced to 
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grant that some people might actually derive a higher level of utility from the same 
bundle of goods, if purchased at lower prices with a lower overall budget: More stuff is 
better, money is only a veil, but some people may yet have preferences regarding the 
characteristics of the veil! 
Everybody loves a bargain. The conventional wisdom is that whatever changes 
might result in the demand function as a result of prices in the utility function can be 
modeled simply as a change in elasticity, indistinguishable from that due to other causes. 
The matter should not be taken so lightly, however, if prices in the utility function lead to 
different behavioral predictions. It turns out that they do, and as usual they emerge easily 
and succinctly from PD analysis. Consider the PD formulation, 
max U(x1, x2, P1, P2) - v(p1, p2, M) s. t. p1x1 + p2x2 = M. 
The PD Lagrangian is 
~* = U(x1, x2,P1,p2)-v(p1,P2, M) + A(M -p1x1 -p2x2). 
The FOC are 
~* p1 = Up1 - Vp1 - AX1 = 0 ~ Vp1 = U* p1 - A *x1 * 
~* p2 = Up2 - Vp2 - AX1 = 0 ~ Vp2 = U*p2 - A *x2* 
~*M= UM-VM+ A= 0 ~ VM= U*M+ ').,* 
Note that while it is still true that v = U*, their derivatives are no longer equal 
because they are taken with respect to parameters which appear in both the objective 
function and the constraint. These are the envelope relations for a problem of that sort.6 
Nevertheless, when these identities are differentiated in order to obtain the second 
6 See Silberberg, Structure, p. 200. 
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partials of v, the interpretation still can only be the relevant second partials of U, 
evaluated at the optimum. 
When the first partials of~* (not equated to zero) are differentiated a second 
time, the resulting second partials of U which appear in the second-order conditions must 
also be evaluated at the optimum. These second partials of~* are then simplified by 
substituting the second partials of v obtained by differentiating the first-order identities. 
The resulting expressions for the second partials of~* with respect to the parameters are 
the same as those for the model without prices in the utility function. The second partials 
of U disappear in the present case because they occur both in their own right, as 
derivatives of the direct objective function, and as a term in the expression for the 
derivatives of the indirect function, a consequence of the primal-dual formulation. They 
do not occur in the other case because U is not a function of the parameters. For example, 
have 
~*p1p1 = Up1p1- Up1p1 -11. *(Bx1*!8p1)-x1*(B11. *!Bp1) 
= - A *(Bx1 *!Bpi) - x1 *(BA *!Bpi), 
just as for the case without prices in the utility function. The same is true for all the other 
second derivatives. 
But dividing either of the first two FOC by the third to derive Roy's identity yields 
(Vp; - Up;)/(vm - UM)= -Xi. 
This relation, while clearly analogous to Roy's identity, is distinguished by the 
presence of the differences between the derivatives of U and v at the optimum (instead of 
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those of v only), as it is based upon the envelope relations which, as mentioned above, 
differ from those for parameters which do not appear in the objective function. 
The PD formulation of the dual problem is 
minp1x1 + p2x2- e(p1,P2, U) s.t. U(x1, x2,P1,p2) = U 
The PD Lagrangian is 
The FOC are 
~* = p1x1 + p2x2- e(p1,P2, U) + µ[U - U(x1, x2,P1,p2)]. 
~*p, =x1 -ep, -µUp,= 0 ~ ep, = h1* -µ*Up, 
~*p2 =x2-ep2-µUp2 = 0 ~ ep2 = h2* -µ*Up2 
~*µ= -eµ+µ=O~eµ= -µ*. 
So differentiating the identity h;*(p1,P2, U) = x;*(p1,p2, e(p1, p2, U)) with respect 
to PJ and substituting for epJ from the FOC above, the Slutsky relation for this problem is 
8x;*/8pJ = 8h;*/8pJ- (8x;*/8M)(x/ - µ*(8U/8pJ)) 
= 8h;*/8pJ-x/(8x;*/8M) + µ*(8x;*/8M)(8U/8pj) 
8x;*l8pJ + X;*(8x;*/8M) = 8h;*/8pJ + µ*(8x;*/8M)(8U/8pJ) 
Kalman and Intriligator first recognized the existence of generalized Slutsky 
relations of this sort for a very general class of models in 1973,7 and they noted the 
application to consumer theory for the case in which prices enter the utility function. It is 
possible without using their results to derive the above relation by conventional methods, 
but PD analysis does the job succinctly and efficiently. It is easy to see that the matrix of 
generalized substitution effects (the right hand side of the last equation above) is 
7 Kalman and Intriligator, 1973. The last equation above is their equation 3.3, p. 482 
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symmetric. Kalman and Intriligator prove this is true for the general case, and also that 
this matrix is negative semidefinite under fairly general conditions. 
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CHAPTER III 
A SIMPLE BANKING MODEL 
A simplified banking model can illustrate further how the results of PD analysis 
depend on whether parameters appear in the objective function or in the constraint, and 
also the benefits and limitations of the method. Consider a profit-maximizing bank that 
earns rate rL on loans Land pays rate rD on demand deposits D. Assume that the bank is 
subject to a reserve requirement q = RID, 0 < q < 1. Assume that the bank also incurs 
costs related to both the loans it services and the deposits it administers expressed as 
C(L,D). (We will consider the shape of the cost function later.) The bank thus maximizes 
the function 
n = rrL - r~ - C(L, D). 
The bank's only assets are the loans and the reserves, and the demand deposits are 
its only liabilities. Therefore its balance sheet is represented by the constraint that its "net 




In one version of this problem it is assumed that w is identically zero, because 
otherwise profit can be increased in direct proportion to an infusion of capital. But this 
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assumption obscures certain aspects of the model while simplifying the analysis only 
slightly, so it is not made here. 
If the original objective function is maximized over the decision variables Land 
D, subject to the constraint, by the Lagrangian technique, the result is the maximum 
profit as a function of the parameters, n*(rL, rD, w, q). This process also generates 
expressions for the value of the multiplier at the point of optimality, 
assuming that costs are increasing with an increase in deposits (CD> 0). 1 
Next we form the primal-dual Lagrangian, 
$£* = rrL - r~ - C(L, D) - n*(rL, rD, w, q) + 11,(w -L + (1 - q)D), 
and set its derivatives with respect to the parameters equal to zero for the FOC: 
$£* r = L - n* r = 0 => n* r = L * > 0 (because L > 0 by definition) 
L L L 
$£* rv = -D - n* rv = 0 => n* rv = -D* < 0 (because D > 0 by definition) 
$£* q = -11,D - n* q = 0 => n* q = -11, * D* < 0 (if CD> 0 => 11, * > 0) 
Now we have an interesting situation. The first two FOC are true envelope 
relations, involving derivatives (of the direct and indirect objective functions) with 
respect to parameters which enter the objective function only. The latter two are "pseudo-
envelope" relations involving derivatives of the indirect objective function only with 
respect to parameters that enter the constraint only. In the utility-maximization problem, 
1 The existence of a maximum for the objective function depends on the characteristics of the cost function, 
in particular upon the second partials with respect to Land D. More on this later. The Lagrange multiplier, 
however, is interpreted here as the "shadow price" or value ofan additional unit of net worth, and is 
therefore definitely positive as an increase in w increases profit directly. 
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it is from these latter relations that Roy's identity is derived. Here we can derive a closely 
analogous relation, 
(8n*/8q)/(8n*/ow) = -D*. 
The ratio of the response of the maximum possible profit to a change in the 
reserve ratio to that to a change in the net worth of the bank is negative ( as might be 
expected) because D > 0 by definition, and it is equal in absolute value to the level of 
deposits, which is surprising and potentially useful. 
On the other hand, the ratio of the derivatives with respect to the parameters 
appearing in the objective function is simply the negative of the ratio of the 
corresponding choice variables. This results from the fact that the objective function is 
linear in those parameters, and from the fact that they are absent from the constraint. 
Of the various ratios of one of the former class of relations to one of the latter, 
perhaps the most elegant are 
(8n*/8q)/(8n*/8rD) =A* 
(8n*/ow)/(8n*/8rL) = A *IL*. 
The interpretation of these relations, and of the last 2 of the FOC, is enhanced by 
knowledge of the sign of A*, which is positive if CD> 0, but not necessarily otherwise. 
The value of all Roy-like relations as testable hypotheses is limited by the fact that they 
involve not only the optimum value of the objective function (which may plausibly be 
taken as the actual value if that is the assumption being tested), but also the Lagrange 
multiplier, which is not directly observable (but which can sometimes be calculated). 
Taking the second partials of~* and substituting the derivatives of the FOC gives 
the second partials, 
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~* qrL =- 1t* qrL = 8().. *D*)/Brr = A *(8D*/8rr) + D*(8A */Brr) 
~* qq = - 1t* qq = 8().. *D*)/Bq = A *(8D*/8q) + D*(8).. */Bq) 
~* qw =- 1t* qw = 8().. *D*)/Bw = A *(8D*/8w) + D*(BA */Bw) 
~* =-1t* =-8)..*/Brr wrL wrL 
~* =-1t* =-8)..*/Brn wrD wrD 
~* wq =- 1t*wq =- 8).. */8q 
~*ww =-1t*ww =-8)..*/Bw. 
Consider first the symmetry relations, of which there are 6: 
,o* = - 8L*/8q = 8(A *D*)/Brr = ~* ;;i.. rLq qrL 
,o* = 8D*/8q = 8()..*D*)/Brn = ~* ;;J.. ~q q~ 
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~* = 8D*/8w = - 8A */8rn = co* ~w ~ ~ 
~* qw = 8(A * D*)/ow = - 8A */8q = ~* wq 
All of these relations except the first are limited in their usefulness by the 
presence of derivatives of the multiplier (three of them derivatives of the product A* D*). 
With that reservation, each constitutes a testable hypothesis of whether the firm is 
maximizing profit on the basis of the model. In practice, the first relation, involving only 
the quantities of loans and deposits and the rates on both would probably be the most 
feasible to test empirically. 
Now consider the Hessian matrix of the primal-dual Lagrangian: 
- 8L*/8rL -8L*/8q -8L*/8w 0 
8D*/8rL 8D*/8rn 8D*/8q 8D*/8w 0 
~*aa= 8(A * D*)I 8rL 8(A *D*)/8rn 8(A*D*)/8q 8(A*D*)/8w -D* 
-8/1.. */8q -8A*low 1 
0 0 -D* 1 0 
The necessary second-order condition for a maximum is that this matrix be 
negative semi-definite, implying that its border-preserving principal minors of order k 
have sign (-ll or zero. Among the order-2 minors, that including columns 1 and 2 is 
equal to zero because of the bordering zeroes. Those including columns 1 and 3 and 
columns 2 and 3 happen to be standard CS derivatives, whose signs· are thus determined, 
and those including columns 1 and 4, and 2 and 4, produce the same results: 
8L*/8rL ~ 0 
8L*/8rn :'.5: 0. 
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The symmetry result applied to the second of these produces another, 
8D*/8rL ~ 0. 
And a basic conjugate pairs result2 yields 
8D*/8rD s 0. 
This result and the first one above also follow from the negativity of the diagonal 
elements of the matrix. Similarly, we can also state that 
,' 
/ 
8"A*/8w ~ 0, 
and 
8("A * D*)/8q s 0 
"A *(8D*/8q) + D*(8"A */8q) s 0. 
Since D* > 0 by definition, then if A* > 0, this expressions says that either 8D* /8q 
or 8"A */8q or both must be non-positive, and it sets a condition on the relative magnitudes 
of these responses if they are of opposite sign. While this relation may be difficult to 
apply in practice, the next one may be less so and its interpretation is similar. 
The minor that includes columns 3 and 4 produces a complex expression that 
simplifies to a potentially useful result: 
D23 = +D*(-D*(8D*/8rD)) = -D*2(8D*/8rD) ~ 0 => 8D*/8rD s 0 
D34 = -D*[8("A *D*)/8w-D*(8"A */8w)] - [8("A *D*)/8q-D*(8"A */8q)] ~ 0 
D*["A *(8D*/8w) + D*(8"A */8w)-D*(8"A */8w)] 
2 See Currier, Theorem 5-lB, p. 81. 
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+ [A *(BD*!Bq) + D*(BA */Bq)-D*(BA *!Bq)] ::; 0 
11,*[D*(BD*/Bw) + BD*!Bq]::; 0 
But if A*> 0, then D*(BD*/8w) + BD*/aq::; 0. Since D* > 0 by definition, this 
says that deposits must decrease in response to an increase either in w or in q or in both, 
and it sets a condition on the relative sizes of the responses if they are of opposite sign. 
We might expect to find BD*!Bq::; 0, but this is not assured by any of the foregoing. (In 
fact, the sign of BD*/Bq cannot be determined by conventional analysis, either.) 
Two of the order-3 minors and the entire determinant yield complex expressions 
which, because none of the terms vanishes or is equal to unity, do not simplify. The 
order-3 minors that include columns 1 and 2 and either column 3 or column 4 produce 
the same expression: 
D124 = - [(BL */Brn)(BD*/arL)- (BL */BrL)(D*/Brn)]::; 0 
= (BL */BrL)(D*!Brn) - (BL */Brn)(BD*!BrL)::; 0 
(BL*/BrL)(D*/Brn)::; (BL*/Brn)(BD*!BrL). 
This says that the product of the "own-rate effects" is less than or equal to the 
product of the "cross-rate effects." But we know from the first two order-2 minors that 
the former are opposite in sign, and from the first symmetry relation that the latter are 
also opposite in sign. Therefore, what this relation actually says is that the product of the 
magnitudes of the "own-rate effects" is greater than or equal to that of the "cross-rate 
effects." 
l(BL*/BrL)l l(D*/Brn)I ~ l(BL*!arn)l l(BD*/BrL)I 
Next consider the dual problem, 
minimize w = L- (1 - q)D, subject tor~ - rnD- C(L, D) = n. 
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Now we see why it helps to include was a parameter in the primal problem. If the 
constraint in the primal problem is written simply as L = (1 - q)D, or even if the 
expression L - (1 - q)D is assigned a specific numerical value ( e.g., zero), careful 
attention is needed to recognize what it is that must be minimized in the dual problem. 
Indeed, the nature of the duality itself is obscured. Including w as a parameter makes it 
clear that the duality is between w and n ( or w* and n), and that if n is the level of profit 
that results when w = 0, the minimum level ofw that can produce a profit ofn is w = 0. 
The PD Lagrangian (of the dual problem) is 
~* = L - (1 - q)D + µ(n - rrL +rd)+ C(L, D)) - w*(rr, rD, q, n). 
The FOC with respect to the parameters are 
~* =-µL-w* =O=>w* =-µ*L* rL rL rL 
~* =µD-w* =O=>w* =µ*D* rD rv rD 
~*q =D-w*q = 0 => w*q =D* 
~*Jt = µ-w*n = 0 => w*Jt = µ*. 
Because of the way the respective Lagrangians are set up,µ*= 1/A *, which can 
be verified from the FOC (with respect to the decision variables) for the ordinary dual 
problem. Now, the optimized values of the variables in the dual problem, L * and D*, are 
"compensated" variables, for which the bank's net worth w is adjusted for changes in the 
parameters rr, rD, and q in order to maintain a constant level of profit n. Therefore, 
rename these variables Le and De. There are 6 "Roy-like" relations for the dual problem, 
which are ratios of the implied identities above (12 relations counting reciprocals). They 
are not especially enlightening, but examples are included here for completeness and for 
comparison with those for the primal problem: 
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(&w*Jaq)/(&w*/an) =Delµ*= A *DC 
(&w*/8rL)l(&w*/8rD) = -Le/De 
(&w*/arL)/(&w*lan) = -LC 
(fJw*/8rD)/(fJw*/8q) = µ*. 
The signs of the second and third expressions are negative, from the definitions of L and 
D, and those of the first and fourth are positive if A*> 0. 
We can also derive generalized "Slutsky-type" relations for this model. As in the 
utility-maximization model, at the point of optimality the choice variables have the same 
values as their counterparts in the primal problem, L * and D*. In other words, 
L\rL, rD, q, n) = L*( rl, rD, q, w*( rl, rD, q, n)) 
D\rL, rD, q, n) = D*( rl, YD, q, w*(rL, rD, q, n)). 
Differentiating these relations with respect to rL and rD, 
aLc/8rL = aL*/BrL + (BL*l&w*)(&w*/arL) 
aLc/arD = BL*/arD + (oL*l&w*)(Bw*lorD) 
aDc/arL = oD*lorL + (BD*l&w*)(&w*/arL) 
oDc/arD = aD*JarD + (BD*l&w*)(&w*/8rD). 
Rearranging and substituting for the derivatives ofw* (from the FOC) gives the 
generalized Slutsky relations, 
oL*lorL = 8Lc/arl + µ*L*(oL*l&w*) 
aL*/BrD = oLc/arD- µ*D*(BL*l&w*) 
oD*/BrL = aDc/arL + µ*L*(BD*l&w*) 
aD*/BrD = aDclorD- µ*D*(oD*l&w*). 
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Differentiating with respect to q adds another pair: 
BL*/Bq = 8Lc/8q-D*(8L*/8w*) 
BD*/Bq = 8Dc/8q -D*(BD*/Bw*). 
Except for the presence of the Lagrange multiplier in these relations, all but the 
last pair are identical in form to the classical Slutsky relation for the utility maximization 
model. On the other hand, the generalized Slutsky relations for the utility maximization 
model with prices in the objective function have an additional term, which does contain 
the multiplier. The reason for this difference is the arrangement of the parameters. In this 
model (the primal problem) two parameters (rL and rD) appear in the objective function 
only, while the others (wand q) appear in the constraint only. Thus both the objective 
function and the constraint are special cases of the general form considered by Kalman 
and Intriligator, just as in the standard utility maximization model, in which all the 
parameters are in the constraint. In the extended utility maximization model, prices 
appear in both the objective function and the constraint. As a result, derivatives of the 
Lagrangian with respect to those parameters in the generalized Slutsky relation for that 
model contain two terms, instead of one as in these models in which the parameters are 
separated. 3 
As noted earlier, the value of the Lagrange multiplier in this model depends on 
known parameters, and on the derivative of the cost function with respect either to loans 
or to deposits. Thus it is not unobservable in the same sense as in the utility maximization 
model. But the first four Slutsky relations can only be evaluated numerically to the extent 
3 For further details on the way in which the form of the generalized Slutsky relation depends on the forms 
of the objective function and the constraint, see Kalman and Intriligator (1973), especially pp. 474, 478-
479, and 482-483. 
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that the value of CL or CD can be determined. If one of these values can be determined, 
then those relations could conceivably open up an analysis of the way in which a bank 
would adjust its loans and deposits in response to a change in the rate on either one if its 
net worth were automatically adjusted to keep profit at the same level, with implications 
and applications comparable to those of compensated demand and supply. In any case, all 
of these relations provide a new way of looking at certain aspects of banking. 
Next, differentiating and substituting again gives the second partials of~*: 
~* rvq = - w* rvq = -8(µ*Dc)/8q = -µ*(8Dc/aq)-D\8µ*/8q) 
£* =- w* = -aDclarL qrL qrL 
rO* =-w* =-aDc/arD ol. qrD qrD 
rO* =- w* = -aDc/aq ol. qq qq 
ro* =-w* =-8µ*/arL ol. rt rL rt rL 
~* 1t q = - w* 1t q = -aµ* laq 
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$£* irir = - w* irir = -aµ* I an. 
For the dual problem we have the following symmetry relations: 
$£* = B(µ*Lc)/Bn = -8µ*/Brr = $£* 
~1t 1t~ 
$£* = -B(µ*Dc)/Bq = -BDc!Brn = $£* ~q q~ 
$£* = -B(µ*Dc)Jan = -8µ*/Brn = $£* 
~1t 1t~ 
These relations are subject to essentially the same remarks as those made with 
regard to the symmetry relations for the primal problem. 
The Hessian matrix for this problem provides very few useful results. Two of its 
rows rather than one contain derivatives of products, which doubles the number of terms 
in the expansions of minors that include those rows, while the borders contain two 
elements (rather than one, as in the primal problem) which are neither O nor 1. Only three 
of the order-2 minors produce expressions which are not too complex to be of use, and 
they all reduce to the same expression. Since the dual problem involves minimization, the 
bordered Hessian is positive semidefinite, so that with a single constraint, all of its 




In the primal problem, the sign of the corresponding derivative is impossible to 
determine: Even though D* = De at the point of optimality, oD*loq is not necessarily 
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equal to 8Dc /aq. It is possible that this information could be used in conjunction with the 
various relations among those derivatives that have been developed above to determine 
the signs of other individual CS derivatives in addition to those determined earlier for the 
primal problem (p. 39, above), but attempts to do so have yet to succeed. 
Silberberg emphasizes repeatedly that the results generated by the PD method 
consist of all the consequences that follow from the maximization hypothesis alone, and 
no others. Since it does not involve any derivatives with respect to the decision variables 
(the starting point for conventional analysis), it does not take account of anything that 
may be known or assumed about those derivatives. In the standard utility-maximization 
model, the signs of the standard CS derivatives are determined by the signs of the second 
partials of the utility function, and hence by the assumptions made regarding its shape. 
The same is true for this model with regard to the cost function. It has been noted 
that the signs of a number of the relations here can be determined if the sign of A* is 
known, and that A* > 0 if CD> 0. Since the cost function is exogenous to the model, 
there is no way to determine the sign of its derivative within the model. But if the 
reasonable assumption is made that the bank incurs costs to administer both loans and 
deposits ( CL > 0, CD> 0), and the only slightly less plausible assumption that diminishing 
returns to scale result in CLL > 0, CDD > 0, with Cw= 0, is also made, it is possible to 
determine the signs of many of the standard CS derivatives by conventional analysis, 
which results are stated below. These assumptions in themselves do not allow us to 
determine directly the signs of any expressions in the PD analysis other than those 
dependent on the sign of A*: 
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For the primal problem, 
BL*!arr > 0, BL*/BrD < 0, BL*/Bq < 0, BL*low > 0 
BD*/Brr > 0, BD*/BrD < 0, BD*/Bq ?, BD*low < 0 
a"A */Brr> 0, a"A */arD > 0, a"A */Bq > 0, a"A *low< 0. 
For the dual problem, 
aLc/Brr ?, aLc/arD ?, aLc/aq < 0, aLc/an > 0 
aDc/arr > 0, aDc/arD < 0, aDc/aq < 0, aDc/an < 0 
8µ*/Brr < 0, 8µ*/arD ?, 8µ*/Bq < 0, 8µ*/Bn > 0. 
These relations are consistent with those from the PD analysis in which these 
derivatives appear, all of which are more general, being derived with no assumptions on 
the signs of the derivatives of C except where noted. The combination of the two methods 
still leaves indeterminate the signs of the derivatives which are indeterminate under 
conventional analysis alone. 
Which set of conditions is more useful is open to question. On the one hand, it is 
usually simpler empirically to test the sign of a single derivative than to test any more 
complex relation, but this is not always the case. The deeper relations may require 
significant insight and manipulation to develop from the conventional analysis. All of the 
conventional results above rely on the assumptions that the second partials of cost with 
respect to both loans and deposits are positive and that the cross partials are zero, without 
which the second-order conditions for a maximum either fail or are not assured. These 
assumptions are essentially equivalent to the common assumption of a U-shaped LRAC 
curve, which is relatively benign, but which is unnecessary for the PD analysis. 
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One might argue that the question of "usefulness" is academic on the premise that 
this model does not sufficiently resemble actual banking operations to make refutable 
hypotheses derived from it of any use in the "real world." Of course, many textbook 
models share this limitation in varying degrees, but two features of this model stand out 
as being particularly questionable. 
As this model is constructed loans and hence profit can be pumped up without 
limit ( except for that imposed by the convex cost function) simply by pouring in more 
financial capital. Strictly speaking, this does not affect the bank's net worth, because the 
injected assets are offset by an increase in the equity of the investors. Neither the asset 
category nor the equity is separately accounted for in the model; the parameter w called 
"net worth" is actually just the difference between loans plus required reserves and 
deposits. But this is not necessarily unrealistic: If a real bank is "loaned up" (to the limit 
of its reserve requirement), the investors can always in principle issue more stock and 
buy it themselves, thus increasing the bank's excess reserves (assumed to be zero in the 
model), which can then be loaned out to produce additional profit. Presumably the 
investors would not consider such an action unless they were certain that the market for 
additional loans was favorable. As we have shown, including this possibility does nothing 
to make the model unworkable. The essential factor that is ~gnored in the model is not net 
worth but excess reserves. 
A more complete model would recognize that profits contribute to net worth by 
way of retained earnings. In such a model it might then make sense to maximize net 
worth, rather than minimize it. Such a model would then have to recognize other types of 
constraints based on market conditions and perhaps accounting realities. It would also 
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almost have to be a multi-period model, as many realistic models must be, regardless of 
philosophical arguments regarding the importance of dynamics in economics.4 
The other factor omitted from this model is the multiplier effect. The constraint 
that L = (1 - q)D says that deposits in excess ofrequired reserves are loaned out, and that 
these funds then just disappear or are stashed under a mattress, as there is no mechanism 
in the model for them to be redeposited. But there is less here than meets the eye. If a 
redeposit mechanism were incorporated, the theory of the simple deposit multiplier 
would predict that the total amount of money existing after an initial deposit d would be 
d/q. Since all of this money except the initial deposit exists in the form ofloans, and since 
the relation holds for all deposits, the only change in the result would be that the 
coefficient of D would be liq instead of 1 - q. But the essential relation would still be 
strict proportionality between Land D. 
Therefore it appears that this model, simple as it is, may not be significantly more 
"uruealistic" than many other simple models which form the basis of empirical research 
in economics. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to test some of the "refutable hypotheses" 
implied by this model to see whether they can in fact be refuted. 
One aspect of banking that has generated a great deal of interest for 40 years with 
no sign of slacking off is that of expense-preference behavior. As early as 1957, Becker 
showed how non-pecuniary considerations could have economic content and could 
therefore provide managers to pursue objectives other than or in addition to maximizing 
profits for the firm. Stigler (1956) had recognized a year earlier that a significant portion 
of monopoly rents could be hidden in the form of compensation for executives and others 
4 It is worth noting that Samuelson viewed dynamics as the second "Foundation" of economics in addition 
to comparative statics, and in a sense more fundamental. See Samuelson (1983), p. 5. 
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and thus not reported as profits. Baumol (1959) soon made the same observation in a 
different context, as did others. 
Williamson (1963) may have been the first to attempt to operationalize the idea 
into a specific model and examine its performance against data, and also the first to 
recognize that the opportunity for such managerial discretion depends on weak oversight 
of managers by owners (which may be as prevalent in family-owned firms as in large 
corporations). Alchian and Kessel (1962) argued that regulation, like monopoly, provides 
a climate in which managers can divert revenue to uses other than compensating the 
owners of a firm, according to their own preferences and with little to hinder them. 
Edwards (1964, 1977) saw the banking industry as especially open to this sort of 
exploitation by managers, being highly regulated, often highly concentrated, and 
increasingly managed by hired technocrats while owned by a large number of relatively 
small shareholders. A majority of the listings in both the EconLit and ABI/Inform Global 
databases are for articles on banking or other sectors of the financial services industry, 
including studies done in Europe and Latin America. Other industries which have 
received considerable study are public utilities, especially electric power, and common 
carriers such as the trucking industry. 
Many of the studies of the financial services industry focus on the savings and 
loan industry. One reason is that some thrifts are organized as mutual companies, in 
which the depositors are the legal owners but exercise negligible oversight ( often signing 
away their voting rights when they join), while others are stock corporations. It is 
believed by many investigators that the former are more vulnerable to expense-preference 
behavior on the part of managers than are the latter. The evidence on this point is mixed, 
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and may depend on the particular model used or on the type of econometric tests 
employed.5 
Another reason for interest in this sector is the fact that it underwent significant 
deregulation in the 1980s, and it is thought that this change of industry structure should 
reduce the prevalence of expense-preference behavior. Indeed, studies seem to support 
this hypothesis, although it does not appear to be as widely tested as that regarding the 
form of organization.6 
Perhaps the most notable fact about the sample of papers reviewed for this study 
is that very few attempted to do any comparative-statics analysis of the model employed. 
One reason for this is that virtually all of them, and the vast majority of those listed in the 
databases for which only the abstract was examined, are econometric studies. Very few 
are theoretical, and the econometric models tend to be simple linear or log-linear types, 
although some incorporate several parameters of a theoretical model into a single 
regression parameter. Quite a few of the savings and loan studies in fact employ an 
extended version of the model used in this chapter. 
But as has been amply argued by authorities already cited, it is ultimately 
comparative statics that generates testable hypotheses. Indeed, the signs of regression 
coefficients constitute a rudimentary kind of comparative statics, but only when the 
derivatives with respect to the corresponding parameters are obvious, as they are for the 
kinds of models generally used. It would appear that this area is ripe for theoretical work, 
5 For example, Akella and Greenbaum (1988), Mester (1989), Keating and Keating (1992), and Gropper 
and Hudson (2003). The latter includes an extensive and up-to-date bibliography. 
6 Gropper and Hudson (2003). Gropper has written related articles with other collaborators within the past 
decade, and this one also contains references to other works on the effects of banking deregulation, as well 
as a list of survey articles on methodology. 
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including analysis of models such as that used by Akella and Greenbaum and their critics 
and supporters which incorporate several model parameters into a single regr_ession 
parameter. Considering the effects of the model parameters separately could provide 
more precise and specific results. And Primal-Dual analysis would generating a much 
wider range of testable hypotheses than just the CS derivatives themselves, providing 
material for another generation of econometricians. 
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CHAPTER IV 
A LIMIT-PRICING MODEL 
It has been suggested that a monopolist facing a threat of competition from a 
potential entrant might increase output above the monopoly level, thereby lowering its 
price, in an effort to make entry unattractive, a strategy known as "limit pricing." In 
addition, several strategies for raising the fixed cost of entry are widely known. A simple 
limit-pricing model demonstrates how different the analysis of models with very similar 
form can be. 
While the origin of the theory of limit pricing by a monopolist to deter entry into 
the industry by a potential competitor is generally ascribed to Bain (1949), the idea was at 
least suggested by Kaldor (1935). Interestingly, Kaldor mentions the reduction of prices 
by incumbents in an oligopolistic industry not as a strategic behavior the incumbents 
might employ to deter entry, but as a theoretically possible way to prevent loss of total 
surplus due to excess investment into a declining-cost industry which the incumbents' 
self-interest would not lead them to take. Investment in excess capacity is one of the 
strategic options that has emerged as a more plausible alternative to limit prices in one 
group of models that have grown out ofBain's original formulation. 
Bain actually cites no fewer than seven possible reasons a monopolist might 
depart from a profit-maximizing pricing strategy. He also recognizes at least implicitly 
that such a situation is inherently dynamic (involving possible discontinuities and path 
55 
dependence) and strategic (and thus - today- implicitly game-theoretic). Bain's insights 
were further developed by Sylos-Labini (1962) and Modigliani (1958), and by numerous 
others in the 1970s (see Salop, 1979, for further references). 
Dixit (1980), noting the inevitable strategic interactions between incumbent and 
potential entrant, pointed out that most early efforts to analyze the situation adopted the 
"Bain-Sylos postulate" that the entrant would believe that the incumbent would maintain 
the price-limiting level of output even in the event that entry occurred, thus giving it a 
Stackelberg leadership role. But as Dixit also pointed out, the incumbent actually has two 
contradictory incentives: Faced with "an irrevocable fact of entry," a rational agent might 
be expected to make the best of the situation by reducing output to the profit-maximizing 
level given the level of output chosen by the entrant. On the other hand, he would like to 
present a credible threat that in the event of entry he would actually increase output in a 
predatory move to drive down the price still further, since the potential entrant is aware of 
the incentive to do otherwise. Dixit refers to Sherer (1970, ch. 8) for a detailed exposition 
of the Bain-Sylas-Modigliani model and its critique. 
Building on the work of Schelling (1960) and Spence (1977), Dixit (1979, 1980) 
considered prior commitment, primarily in the form of investment in capacity, as the pre-
entry signal to prospective entrants regarding potential profit should they choose to enter. 
Employing only the simplest game-theoretic models he found that outcomes depend in 
sensitive ways upon numerous factors necessarily omitted from any one model. For 
example, he concluded that in the absence of "agreement about the rules of the post-entry 
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game" entry may result in a temporary state of disequilibrium, and that in that case, 
"Financial positions of the firms may then acquire an important role." 1 Emphasizing the 
distinction between the rules assumed to govern the game and the initial conditions with 
which the game begins, Dixit observed that " ... the role of an irrevocable commitment of 
investment in pre-entry deterrence is to alter the initial conditions of the post-entry game 
to the advantage of the established firm,for any fixed rule under which the game is to be 
played" (emphasis added).2 He ended that paper with a question, whether one firm can 
change the rules to its own advantage. 
Salop (1979) also quoted Schelling regarding "the paradox that the power to 
constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself. "3 Salop further asserted 
that some strategies (such as advertising) may rationally be expected to be abandoned if 
entry occurs, a claim that is certainly open to question.4 But he noted as well Spence's 
observation that some strategies, such as cartels, function best as deterrents to entry if 
they are designed to ensure their self-destruction if entry occurs, because competition 
would decrease the gains from entry and hence the incentive to enter. 
J. Friedman (1979) was one of the first to employ a more modem and 
sophisticated game-theoretic approach to entry deterrence, and he made a different 
observation which cast doubt on the plausibility of limit pricing as a workable strategy to 
deter entry. In a complete-information game-theoretic context, pre-entry prices have no 
effect on post-entry costs or demand, and hence none on post-entry profit potential. And 
since the entrant is fully informed regarding that potential, the incumbent's pre-entry 
1 Dixit (1980), p. 95. 
2 Dixit (1980), p. 106. 
3 Salop (1979), p. 335. 
4 ibid. p. 336. 
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price behavior would have no effect on the decision to enter, and limit pricing therefore 
would not occur in equilibrium. Scheffman and Spiller (1992), however, found limit 
pricing to be a likely equilibrium even with full information. 
Recognizing that in the Bain-Sylos framework the entrant is assumed to be using 
the pre-entry price as a signal regarding the incumbent's costs, and hence on the price and 
market shares that can be expected after entry, Milgrom and Roberts (1982) devised a 
game-theoretic model in which the incumbent and potential entrant in a monopolistic 
industry do not have complete information regarding costs and hence do use pre-entry 
price as a signal regarding costs. They found multiple equilibria (a common feature in 
games of this type), and concluded that while limit pricing can exist in equilibrium under 
these assumptions, "The probability that entry actually occurs ... can be lower, the same, 
or even higher than in a regime of complete information .... "5 
The Milgrom and Roberts model has been extended and modified in many ways, 
serving as the basis of a great many of the very large number of articles on entry 
deeterrence published in the past two decades. Bagwell and Ramey (1991) extended the 
basic model to a 2-firm oligopoly and found what they termed "robust, no-distortion 
equilibria" in which incumbents played exactly as if they possessed complete information 
or there were no threat of entry, with entry occurring exactly when it would be profitable 
(the latter as under the Milgrom-Roberts assumptions). They concluded that the basic 
conclusions ofMilgrom and Roberts were correct, but that the latter were incorrect in 
5 Milgrom, Paul, and J. Roberts (1982), p. 443. 
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associating the process by which these outcomes emerged with distortions in pre-entry 
pnces. 
Bagwell and Ramey also drew a distinction which does not seem accurate 
between models based on commitment and those based on signaling. Many if not most 
game theoretic models involve signaling of some sort. The questions has to do with both 
the nature and content of the signal, that is, whether the signal being read is price or 
quantity or something else, and whether it is taken as an indicator of costs, of output 
capacity, of financial strength, or of something else. The different parameters that might 
be assumed to be the content of the signal are Dixit's "initial conditions;" the parameter 
observed and the meaning assumed to be imputed to it are his "rules of the game." 
Most theoretical studies since Milgrom and Roberts have employed some sort of 
sequential game using modem techniques. Most have found at least qualified support for 
the existence of equilibria in which limit pricing occurs, which may or may not deter 
entry depending on the assumptions and the circumstances. Sorenson (2004) extends the 
basic results ofMilgrom and Roberts to multiple-period games. Chowdhury (2002) finds 
multiple Nash Equilibria when one firm has an absolute cost advantage, but only two 
perfect equilibria, which converge to the limit pricing outcome when the range of 
allowable prices becomes small. But with symmetric costs he finds only two equilibria 
which converge to Baumol's contestable-markets outcome, which has otherwise found 
little support.6 Scheffinan and Spiller (1992) consider a variety of game types under a 
6 Baumol, 1982, and references therein. As a partial justification for the "contestable markets" approach, 
Baumol observes (p. 2) that, " ... in the standard analysis (including that of many of our fellow rebels), the 
properties of oligopoly models are heavily dependent on the assumed expectations and reaction patterns 
characterizing the firms that are involved. When there is a change in the assumed nature of these 
expectations or reactions, the implied behavior of the oligopolistic industry may change drastically." 
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wide variety of assumptions in markets for intermediate goods in which buyers' ability to 
make a "credible but costly commitment to switch suppliers."7 They find that such 
commitments, along with sellers' sunk costs (contrary to some other studies of 
commitment), may significantly limit sellers' market power. They find robust limit-
pricing equilibria even with a finite horizon, "unlike many infinite-horizon games."8 
While the search for this review focused on articles dealing specifically with limit 
pricing, the literature on the theory of entry deterrence is vast. Much less vast is the 
empirical literature in this area. Bergman and Rudholm (2003) studied the effects of 
actual and potential competition in the Swedish pharmaceutical industry and found that 
prices tended to decrease for certain drugs as the date of patent expiration neared, which 
could be construed as a form of limit pricing. Significantly, a law in Sweden requires 
drug manufacturers, if the price of a drug if it has ever been reduced, to present hard 
evidence of increased costs before it can ever be raised again. This helps to make the 
Bain-Sylos assumption a credible threat. 
Siegfried and Evans (1994) surveyed over 70 empirical studies of entry-
deterrence behavior in at least 11 countries. They found little support for economies of 
scale, or for strategic use of excess capacity or limit pricing, as entry barriers. Neither 
was high research and development cost an impediment. In fact, innovation may attract 
entry by firms seeking a protected niche. The effects of product differentiation and 
advertising were found to be ambiguous. High absolute cost may be a barrier, depending 
on the specific source, as may multiplant operations. Highly concentrated industries 
usually experience less entry, but the direction of causation is unclear. The authors find 
7 Scheffman and Spiller, 1992, p. 418. 
8 Scheffman and Spiller, 1992, p. 427. 
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these results surprising in light of the many game-theoretic models in which the 
importance of both structural barriers and limit pricing depend on the specific form of 
oligopoly behavior. They found few if any empirical studies which capture this dynamic 
interaction between market structure and firm conduct. They also found few if any 
studies on textbook structural barriers such as patents and control of essential resources. 
They speculate that the weak observed effects of structural barriers may be the result of 
compensating behavior not captured in the empirical studies. 
Given all of the above, especially the sensitivity to the assumptions of the model 
of both the existence oflimit pricing and its ability to deter entry, and especially Dixit's 
observation regarding the potential importance of the financial positions of the firms in 
the temporary disequilibrium state that must ensue once a new firm has entered an 
industry, it would appear that the Bain-Sylos postulate is not as lacking in credibility as 
some writers have assumed. Indeed, even Laffont (1991), who dismisses the credibility of 
the postulate based on Friedman (1979), notes that in extensions of the basic Milgrom-
Roberts model," ... the interpretation of that signal is highly sensitive to model 
specification and only extremely precise knowledge of the industry under study can lead 
to correct interpretation, a consideration which applies to all models with incomplete 
information. "9 
Dixit's remark quoted earlier regarding the importance of the respective financial 
positions of the firms involved seems especially pertinent. From local craft markets to 
global markets for goods such as automobiles, a financially strong producer is always 
cognizant of the potential for using that financial strength to prevent or eliminate 
9 Laffont, 1991, p. pp. 167-168. 
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competitors lacking such resources by pricing below cost for long enough to drive them 
out of the market, even if the potential competitors are not. The perils facing any startup 
business, in any industry at any scale, are sufficiently daunting that a non-nai"ve entrant 
would be foolish not to take seriously the threat of an immediate price war to decide who 
is able to sell below cost for the longer time. Therefore, let us proceed to examine the 
comparative statics of a simple limit-pricing model. 
The model is a static, one-period model, the limitations of which are 
acknowledged. Such a model, however, is nonetheless the basis for whatever may occur 
in subsequent periods of any strategic game, although many other strategic considerations 
obviously affect even the first period, Dixit's "initial conditions." 
Let an incumbent monopolist facing demand D = p(q) produce output qi. Let a 
potential entrant threaten to produce output qe, so that q =qi+ qe, with the entrant facing 
residual demand De= p(q- qi)= p(qe), In order to parameterize the model, let the entrant 
face a fixed cost of entry F, and let qe = j(x), with x representing an input with unit cost w. 
Then the entrant will make profit 1te = p(qi + j(x))f(x) - wx -F. 
The incumbent will attempt to optimize his output qi in order to maximize his 
own profit. In the absence of a threat of entry (and assuming demand for the output is 
elastic at the point of optimality), the incumbent will maximize his profit by producing 
monopoly output qm < qc, where qc is the output that would be produced under perfect 
competition. The resulting increase in price above the competitive level Pc provides the 
incentive for a competitor to try to enter the market and share the monopoly profits. In 
the simplest limit-pricing models the incumbent increases output above the monopoly 
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level, reducing the price if possible to a point at which no feasible output qe results in 
positive profit for the entrant given the fixed cost of entry. 
In reality, the goal of the incumbent is to produce the minimum output consistent 
with non-positive profit for the entrant. But because lower levels of qi ( closer to the 
monopoly level) can result in positive profit for the entrant, to implement this condition 
mathematically requires an inequality constraint. A different approach, however, allows 
the use of an equality constraint, which is simpler and consistent with the PD 
formulation. Assume that the potential entrant faces a typical U-shaped average cost 
curve, and demand as stated above. 
p 
Pm ...................... . 





Do = p( qi+qe) 
~
'---~---~----~-~------qi+qe 
Here, the market demand is Do= p(qi + qe), and the residual demand facing the 
potential entrant when the incumbent produces optimum output q/ is Dr= p(qe; q/). If 
the incumbent were to producing the monopoly output qm, the residual demand facing the 
entrant would be D 1 = p(qe; qm), and at level of output intermediate between qm and q/ 
the entrant would face residual demand D 2 = p(qe; qi). Observe that the residual demand 
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curve for the potential entrant shifts to the left as the incumbent increases output from 
zero to qm and ultimately to q/. 
If the incumbent, facing the entire market demand curve Do, produces output qm, 
the resulting price is Pm· If the incumbent successfully prevents entry (qe = 0) by 
producing output q/, the resulting price is p(q/). If the "Bain-Sylos postulate" that the 
incumbent will maintain the pre-entry (limit-pricing) level is credible, the entrant will 
indeed produce no output because his average cost will exceed the price at every level of 
output except that at which p = AC, yielding no incentive to enter the market. 
If the incumbent produces a level of output between qm and q/, however, there 
will be two levels of output for the potential entrant for which his average cost AC= p. 
Between those two levels, p > AC for the potential entrant, who then is likely to enter and 
reap positive profit. 
The incumbent, wishing to restrict output to reap monopoly profits, would 
actually prefer to minimize output subject top~ A Ce. The inequality constraint is 
necessary because at any level of qi less than q/ (including qm),p > A Ce, in which case 
the potential entrant can make positive profit and thus has an incentive actually to enter 
the market. But if the condition for monopoly profit exists in the first place (E <-1),p = 
ACe for at least one value of qe for all qi such that q/ 2:: qi> qnz. Therefore it is possible to 
consider q/ as the maximum level of q; for whichp(q;) = A Ce with qe = 0 (p(qe; q;) <p(O; 
q;)'il qi, qe > 0). Since qe = j{_x), it is straightforward to show that the conditionp(q; + qe) = 
A Ce= (wx + F)lqe is equivalent to the condition 1te = p(qi + j{_x))f{x)-wx-F = 0, and the 
first-order conditions assure that the solution is restricted to the point of tangency in the 
diagram above. 
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The incumbent's optimum output q/ = q/(w, F), then, represents the industry 
supply as long as entry is prevented. Notice that q is not a :function of p, or even of the 
elasticity of the demand function as is the case for a monopolist not facing a threat of 
entry. In this model the quantity supplied is fixed, determined only by factor cost and the 
fixed cost of entry facing a potential competitor. The monopolist's whole attention has 
been captured by the necessity of dealing with the potential competitor, and he considers 
no other factors. 
The problem for the incumbent, then, is to maximize output q;, subject to the 
constraint, p(q; + fix))f{x) - wx - F = 0. Let the Lagrangian be 
~ = q; + A[p(q; + fix))fix)- wx -F]. 
Then at the point of optimality, 
~q = 1 + )..fix)(8p/8q;) = O 
~x = A[p(q; + fix))f(x) + fix)(8p/8q;)f(x)-w] = 0 
= Af(x)[p(q; +fix))+ fix)(8p/8q;)] - Aw= 0 
From the first condition, 
A*= -1/[f{x)(8p/8q;)] 
Sincefix) > 0 and 8p/8q; < 0, )..* > 0. The second condition yields an expression for A* of 
indeterminate sign. Although this expression for the multiplier is more complex than 
those in most simple models, it can still be interpreted as the shadow price of Fin a sense 
that will be explained below. 
It is then straightforward to show that 
1. The indirect objective function is decreasing in both parameters. 
2. The indirect objective function is quasi-convex in both parameters. 
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3. The incumbent's profit is increasing in F. 
4. An expression can be derived for the maximum value of F needed to make entry 
unprofitable at any level of output. 
5. The response of the incumbent's profit to a change in factor price w is in general 
indeterminate unless the cost function C(w, qi) is known. 
The P-D Lagrangian involves the same objective function with the same 
constraint, minus the value function of the original objective function, 
Then 
~* = qi - q/ + 11,[p(qi + j(x))j(x) - wx - F]. 
~* w = -8q/!8w- A,X = 0 => 8q/!8w = -11, *x* < 0 
~*F =-8q//8F- 11, = 0 => 8q//8F = -11, * < 0 
Thus the indirect objective function is indeed decreasing in both parameters, and 
the quasi-convexity of qi in wand F follows from the linearity of the constraint in these 
parameters. These are pseudo-envelope relations, derivatives of the indirect objective 
function with respect to parameters which occur only in the constraint. Indeed, not only 
are there no parameters in the objective function, but the objective function is itself one 
of the choice variables, somewhat unusual but entirely acceptable. 
These relations also confirm the nature of the multiplier 11, * as the "shadow price 
of F." In the derivation from the primal Lagrangian, the dimensions of 11, * are the 
negative reciprncal of the quantity, "units of output times price divided by units of 
output," or -lip. But the dimensions of p are dollars per unit of output, so those of 11, * are 
the negative of units of output per dollar. In the first pseudo-envelope relation, the 
dimensions of 11, * are units of incumbent's output divided by the product of dollars per 
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unit of input with units of entrant's input (a cost to the entrant). In the second relation 
above, they are simply the negative of units of incumbent's output per dollar of fixed 
entry cost. That is, A* represents the value to the incumbent of a $1 increase in the fixed 
cost of entry, in terms of the number of units that the incumbent can reduce output below 
the limit-pricing level, toward the monopoly level. 
The second derivatives of the Lagrangian w/r/t the parameters, where g(w, F) is 
the constraint function p(qi + j{x))f(_x) - wx - F (which is equal to zero at the optimum), 
are 
~* ww = 8(-q/ w - h)/8w = -a2-q/!8w2 = A *x* w +A* wX* 
~* wF = 8(-q/ w - AX)IBF = -cf2q//8w8F = A *x*F +A* FX* 
leading to the P-D Hessian: 




As always, li must be negative semi-definite at the optimum (maximum value of 
qi= q/ subject to constraint). The only border-preserving principal minor of the 
determinant of this matrix is the determinant of the entire matrix, which is of order 2 and 
therefore non-negative: 
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The second and third terms in each bracket cancel, leaving only 
'A*x*x*F-A *x*w ~ 0 
X*X*F~X*w, 
since 'A*> 0. 
This is an important result in the sense that it makes specific predictions about the 
ways that the potential entrant's optimum use of input would change when either of the 
cost parameters wand F change. If the production function is assumed to be monotonic, 
changes in output are of the same sign as changes in input. The signs of these derivatives 
are of particular interest in the analysis of the dual problem, and in the generalized 
Slutzky relation. 
Unfortunately, the sign of x* w appears in general to be indeterminate, strongly 
dependent on the shapes of the demand and AC curves. The shape of the AC curve in turn 
depends on that of the production function, which determines the shape of MC(y), given 
C = wx - F. It can be shown that x* F > 0 if the demand function is linear, but in general 
the sign of x* F is also indeterminate. Since x* > 0, if x* F < 0 then x* w < 0 as well, but 
this appears to be the only general statement that can be made about these derivatives. It 
does appear from graphical analysis that the changes in the potential entrant's output in 
response to changes in w or Fare relatively small. 
If x* = 0, then x* w = 0, but the fact that entry has been thwaqed does not in 
general result in x* = 0: Instead, x* is the non-zero level of output at which the entrant 
would earn exactly zero profit when the incumbent is practicing limit pricing, as is clear 
from the diagram. 
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It is also the case that the principal diagonal elements of the bordered Hessian 
must be non-positive: 
"A*x*w + "A*llx* ~ 0 
"A*p~O 
From the first of these we get 
"A* w ~ -"A *x* wlx* 
Since "A* > 0 and x* > 0, this relation places a condition on the sign and/or value 
of "A* w, depending on the sign of x* w· 
Also, from the symmetry of the cross partials, 
"A* w = "A *x* F + 11. * px* 
("A *w - A *x*p)/x* = "A *p ~ 0 
And since x* > 0, 
"A*w-"A*x*p~ 0 
x*p~"A*wl"A*. 
Since "A* w has an upper bound as shown above, this places a lower bound on x* F· 
But since the sign of "A* w is unknown and x* Fis known to be positive at least under some 
conditions, this relation is oflittle use. 
It can be shown that the response of the incumbent's profit to a change in fixed 
cost of entry 1t* F > 0 as follows. As long as entry is prevented so that qi is the entire 
output and qi= D(p), 
1t* = p(q/)q/ - C(w, q/), where q/ = q/(w, F). 
Then, 
1t*p = q/(dpldq)(8qi*/8F) + p(Bq/lBF)- (8C/8qi)(8q/!8F) 
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= [q;*(dpldq) + p- (8C/8q;)]·(8q;*/8F) 
Since 8q;*/8F =-'A*< 0 (from the FOC of the P-D Lagrangian), then 
n*p = [q;*(dp/dq) + p- (8C/8q;)}(8q;*/8F) > 0, if and only if 
[q;*(dpldq) + p- (8C/8q;)] < 0 
p < - q;*(dp/dq) + (8C/8q;) 
1 <-(q;*lp)(dpldq) + (l/p)(8C/8q;) 
1 < -1/E + (l/p)(8C/8q;) 
1 - (llp)(8C/8q;) <-1/E 
(llp)(8C/8q;) > 1 + 1/F., 
where f. is the price elasticity of demand for the output, and p = p(q;*(w, F)). 
For monopoly profits to be possible, F. < -1, so 
-1 < 1/E < 0 which means that 
0 < 1 + 1/F.. 
Substituting into the above, the condition for n* F > 0 then becomes 
(l/p)(8C/8q;) > 0. 
Therefore it is always the case that n*p > 0 as long as 8C/8q; = MC(q;) > 0. 
Substituting MC for 8C/8q; in the previous inequality and rearranging yields 
(p-MC)lp <-1/F.. 
The left side of this inequality is the price-cost margin, and also the Lerner Index 
of market power. The profit-maximizing condition for a monopoly is that the price-cost 
margin be equal to -1 /F.. Thus the inequality means that if n* F > 0 the monopolist is not 
maximizing profit but is pricing below the profit-maximizing level, i.e., limit pricing. 
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The previous inequality can also be rearranged to read 
p < (8C/8qi)[l/(1 + 1/E)]. 
This means that if the incumbent is receiving any monopoly profit, 
MC<p <MC.[ll(l + 1/E)], 
where the multiplier in brackets is greater than one, approaching unity as demand 
approaches unitary elasticity. If demand is only slightly elastic at the optimum output 
q;*(w, F), then at that level of output p - MC (monopoly profit becomes negligible). 
Determining the level of F which will make entry unprofitable at any level is 
tantamount to asking how high F must be to cause p and qi to have the same values as 
when fending off entry is not a consideration. In other words, the value of F that 
absolutely prevents entry is equal to the maximum profit (not considering F) the potential 
entrant could obtain by any choice of the level of input x when the incumbent is 
producing the monopoly output qm which is exogenous and therefore parametric to the 
present model. 
The potential entrant's profit is 
1te = p(qm + f{x))j{x)- wx 
81te!ax = p(qm + f{x))f (x) + f{x)(8p/8x) - w 
= p(qm + f{x))f(x) + f{x)(dp/dq')f (x)- w 
= [p(qm + f{x)) + j{x)(dpldq)]f (x) - w. 
Sincef(x) > 0, and dp/dq < 0, in order for &Jax to equal zero (interior 
maximum) it must be the case that 
p(q*(w) + j{x)) + f{x)(dpldq) > 0 
dpldq > -[p(qm + f{x))]ij(x) 
71 
- dp/dq < [p(qm + j(x))]ij(x) 
- dq/dp > j(x)l[p(qm)+ j(x))] 
-(p/q)(dq/dp) > pj(x)lq[p(qm + j(x))] 
-E > j(x)lqm 
-E > j(x)/(qm + j(x)), 
which is true for all E < -1. 
Therefore, the potential entrant's profit is maximized for the x* that solves 
onef8x = p(qm + j(x))f(x) + j(x)(oplox)- w = 0 
p(qm + j(x*))f(x*) + j(x*)(oplox) =- w, 
and the value of F that absolutely prevents entry is 
F = 1te * = p(qm + j(x*))j(_x*) - wx*. 
The fact that the value of Fis even a consideration for the monopolist is evidence 
that he is not practicing what some writers call "naYve profit maximization," that is, 
setting output at the level at which MR = MC. In fact, the preceding analysis shows that 
the monopolist faced with a threat of entry has an incentive to take action (at a certain 
cost to himself) to increase the value of F, as well as to adjust his output in response to a 
change in F, if possible to the point at which a potential competitor cannot earn profit 
above the rental rate of capital. Salop (1979) reports a personal communication in which 
Stiglitz observed that "all deterrence instruments create intertemporal relationships in the 
profit function. 1110 Salop goes on to interpret this as meaning that all deterrence 
instruments, including limit pricing, function as capital, thus generalizing the concepts of 
10 Salop, 1979, p. 337. 
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specific kinds of investment ( or "binding commitment") as entry deterrents discussed 
earlier. 
Regarding the response of the incumbent's profit to a change in factor price w, 
consider the monopolist's profit function, 
n* = p(q(i*))q - wi*, 
where i* = i*(w), the level of input that maximizes the incumbent's monopoly profits in 
the absence of a threat of entry. If this function is differentiated with respect to w and the 
first-order condition with respect to i substituted, the result is the same as for a similar 
competitive firm, n* w = -i*(w) < 0. But the incumbent's input i is not a variable in the 
limit-pricing model. As before, we must differentiate the function 
n* = p(q;*(w, F))·q;* - C(w, q;*) 
n*w = q;*(8p/8w) + p(8q;*/8w)- [Cw+ (8C/8q;)(8q;*/8w)] 
= q;*(dp/dq)(8q;*/8w) + p(8q;*/8w)- Cw - (8C/8q;)(8q;*/8w) 
= [q;*(dp/dq) + p- (8C/8q;)](8q;*/8w)- Cw. 
It was shown earlier (when evaluating n* F) that the expression in brackets is 
negative if and only if (l/p)(8Claq;) > 1 + 1/i::, which is the case if the incumbent is 
operating in the elastic part of the demand curve and is producing all the output. It was 
also shown from the FOC (envelope conditions) that 8q;*/8w = Jf"x* ~ 0. If the 
incumbent is the sole producer, then the potential entrant's actual outputf{x) = 0, so the 
corresponding input x = 0. But x* is the non-zero input which would produce zero profit 
at the given levels of w and F. Thus the first term in the above expression is positive. 
But it is also the case that Cw> 0, and so the sign of n* w depends on the relative 
magnitudes of these two quantities. Unless the cost function C(w, q;) is known, nothing 
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further can be said of the sign of 1t* w· If, however, empirical observation were to discover 
that the incumbent's profits increased upon an increase in factor prices, this would be 
evidence that the incumbent was not maximizing the ordinary (monopoly) profit function, 
but some other, possibly our limit-pricing function. 
In principle, we could analyze this situation in terms of the cost function C(w, q;*) 
= wi*, where i*(w, F) is the input needed by the incumbent to produce output q;*. If this 
form is adopted, Cw= i* + w(8i*/ow), and 
1t* w = q;*(8p/ow) + p(8q;*/ow)- i* + w(8i*/ow) 
= q;*(dp/dq)(8q;*/ow) + p(8q;*/ow) - i* + w(8i*/ow) 
= [q;*(dp/dq) + p](8q;*low)- i* + w(8i*/8w). 
Inclusion of a fixed cost not dependent upon w would not alter this relation. It was 
shown earlier that 8q;*/ow < 0, and if output q is monotonic in input i, then 8i*/ow < 0 as 
well. Therefore, the sign of 1t* w depends on the relative magnitudes of p > 0 and 
q;*(dpldq) < 0. If p > lq;*(dp/dq)I, then the factor in brackets is positive and the first term 
is negative, in which case 1t* w < 0, as usual. But if lq;*(dp/dq)I > p, the factor in brackets 
is negative, the first term is positive, and the sign of 1t* w is again indeterminate. This 
would leave open again the empirical possibility that 1t* w > 0 might be observed, 
indicating that the incumbent was not maximizing the ordinary profit function and might 
be limit pricing. 
In the expression above, 8i*/ow is a conventional CS derivative for the primal 
limit-pricing objective function. But that function is not expressed in terms of i but of q, 
so to obtain an expression for Bi*/ow would require re-framing the original problem in 
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terms of i. Such an exercise might also make it possible to obtain more useful results 
from the P-D Hessian. 
There does exist a "Roy-like" relation, the ratio of the two pseudo-envelope 
relations, 
(8q/!8w)/(8q/!8F) = (-A *x*)/(-A *) = x*, 
precisely analogous to Roy's Identity in the Utility-maximization model. 
This relation provides no testable hypothesis, because this "optimum" level of 
entrant's input, the ratio of these two derivatives of the incumbent's output with respect to 
the parameters, is not chosen on any consideration of the producer who might actually 
use that input. It does, however, lend some insight into the workings of the model. This 
level of the entrant's input is in no sense an optimum to the entrant himself, but is the 
result of a choice by the incumbent to produce a level of output which makes it 
impossible for the entrant to earn positive profit. Given that his maximum potential profit 
is zero, the potential entrant either does not enter (and consumes no input, x =t= x*), or else 
engages in some strategic behavior intended to call the incumbent's bluff and force a 
change in his behavior. 
Analysis of the dual problem provides some further insight. The original (primal) 
problem is 
"Choose q; and x to maximize q;, subject to p(q; + j{x)):f{x) - w(x) - F = 0." 
We would therefore expect the dual problem to be 
"Choose x to minimize ne = p(q; + j{x)):f{x) - w(x) -F, subject to q; = q; ," 
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where ii is the optimum value of q; found in the primal problem. But the considerations 
that forced us to maximize the primal objective function force us to maximize the dual 
function as well. To see why, return to the diagram. 
p(qt+ 0) 
0 Qm Qe qt 
= f(x*} 
As the incumbent increases production from zero (Do, the entire market demand 
curve) first to qm, the monopoly output, and eventually to q;*, the limit-pricing output, the 
residual demand curve left to the potential entrant shifts steadily to the left (D1, D2, DL), 
As in the primal problem, for any given levels of w and F, which fix the potential 
entrant's AC curve, and given q; =ii= q;* from the primal problem, if the entrant chooses 
to use xd = x* and produce output j{x*), the price at the resulting level of industry output 
is just equal to his average cost and entry is unprofitable. For any other choice of input 
and hence of output, the entrant's average cost exceeds the resulting price and his 
potential profit is negative. 
In other words, the dual function has no minimum, but it does have a maximum. 
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The function given above, however, is unduly complicated. It contains a constant, 
F, which does not affect the optimum value. All that is necessary is to maximize the 
difference between the potential entrant's revenue p(qi + f{x)):f(x) and his variable cost wx 
for any given level of qi, recognizing that at q/(w, F) (and the level of F that generated 
it) the maximum value of this difference and hence of 1te is zero. 
The dual problem, then, will be 
"Choose x (and qi) to maximize le= p(qi + f{x)):f(x)- w(x), subject to qi= iii," 
where le can be considered as the income of the potential entrant net of variable costs. 
Note that qi is not really a choice variable in this case, and it would be possible to 
incorporate the constraint into the objective function. We will consider it separately, 
however, paralleling the analysis of the primal problem. 
The Lagrangian for this problem, using the same format as for the primal 
problem, is 
d -
~ = p(qi + f{x)):f(x) - w(x) + µ(qi - qi) 
The first-order conditions are 
~dx = j(x)(8p!ax)f(x) + p(qi + j(x)j(x)- w 
= f(x)[j(x)(8p/8x) + p(qi + j(x)] -w = 0 
~dx = (8p/8x)j(x) + µ = 0 =;>Ji'= -j(x)(8p!ax) > 0 
Let ¢1...w, iii) be the value function of the above. Then the Primal-Dual Lagrangian is 
<l> = p(qi + f{x)):f(x)- w(x)- <p (w, iii)+ µ(qi - iii) 
The first-order conditions with respect to the parameters are 
d -
<l>w = -x - </Jw = 0 =;> </Jw = -X (w, qi)< 0 
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<Dq = -¢q - µ = 0 => qJq = -Ji'(w, ii) < 0 
Interpretation: The optimum (maximum) value of le decreases when either w or 
ii increases. The former is clear: An increase in w raises the potential entrant's AC across 
the board, reducing the difference between his revenue and his variable cost. An increase 
in ii (above qm and even above q;*) does the same thing by shifting his residual demand 
curve to the left relative to his fixed AC curve. 
The second derivatives of the Primal-Dual Lagrangian are 
<Dwq = B(Id w)IBii = 8(-efJw)/80 = - ¢wq = Bxd!Bii 
<Dqw = B(Idq)!Bw = 8(-rjJq)IBw = - ¢qw = aµ'!aw 
<Dqq = -¢qq = -a(-Jf)!Bii = aµ'1a0 




must be negative semi-definite. The determinant of this matrix has no BPPM other than 
itself, which is readily seen to be 
Making use of the symmetry of the cross partials, 
d - .fl Bx !Bqi = 8µ !Bw, 
the inequality above can be rewritten as 
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Furthermore, the principal diagonal elements of Hare non-positive: 
axd/ow::;; O; aµ1/aq;::;; 0. 
The former is to be expected. The latter is difficult to interpret in light of 
µ1 =-j{x)(Bp/Bx). But note that the optimum value of the multiplier in this dual problem 
is the reciprocal of that in the primal problem, as it should be. 
By Currier's Theorem 5-3B 11 there is a reciprocity relation involving the other 
two derivatives: 
Idxw(Bxd/Bq;) = Id µq(B/low) 
But returning to the first-order conditions for the Primal-Dual Lagrangian, above, both of 
the derivatives of Id are -1, so this is simply the symmetry condition above. 
A generalized Slutsky relation can be obtained by setting the optimum value of xd 
in the dual problem equal to that of x* in the primal problem and differentiating with 
respect to w: 
xd(w, q;) = x*(w, <l>(w, q; )) · 
axd/ow = ax*/ow + (8x*/8</i)(8¢/ow) 
= Bx*/ow + (Bx*/8</i)(-xd) 
But at the optimum, xd = x*. Furthermore, as the optimum value of p(qi + f{x)):f{x) 
- w(x) subject to the constraint, rfi...w, q;) is equal to the value of F that resulted in x*, 
because Fis the amount by which rfi...w, q;) is reduced to yield 7te = 0 at the optimum. The 
Slutsky relation thus becomes 
11 Currier, p. 87. 
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Bxd/ow = ox*/ow - x*(Bx*IBF), or 
Bx*/ow = Bxd/ow + x*(Bx*IBF). 
This is identical to the ordinary Slutsky equation in the utility-maximization 
model except for the sign of the compensating term. In the utility-maximization model an 
increase in M leads to an increase in x*, meaning that the slope of the compensated 
demand curve is always less negative than that of the uncompensated demand. In this 
limit-pricing model, however, Bx*/BF can be either positive or negative, which means 
that the slope of the "compensated factor demand," in effect adjusting the fixed cost of 
entry to return the entrant's factor demand to the value it would have if the incumbent's 
output qi were a choice variable, can be greater or less than the latter value. 
Since x*(Bx*/BF) ~ Bx*!Bw (p. 67), and Bxd/ow::;; 0 (p. 78), the Slutsky relation is 




The Primal-Dual analysis of the utility-maximization model accomplishes three 
things: 
• It confirms the validity of the method by generating all results of conventional 
analysis (Roy's identity and the Slutsky equation) not dependent upon 
assumptions regarding the signs of the derivatives of utility. 
• It confirms that despite the important role of the arrangement of the 
parameters in the objective function and the constraint function (which itself 
is evident from PD theory but relatively obscure in conventional analysis\ it 
is the particular form of those functions that determines the nature of the CS 
relations.2 This is not especially surprising, but one could be led from 
Silberberg's discussion to expect that the arrangement or distribution of the 
parameters plays a larger role. 
1 See Silberberg, 1990, 210-216. 
2 A protracted effort was made to analyze a model of decision making for environmental regulation using 
PD methodology. Like the utility-maximization model, that model has no parameters in the objective 
function, and three in the constraint, including one representing a level of the constraint. It was determined 
that all of the BPPM of the Hessian determinant for that model are equal to zero, which means that while 
the second-order necessary condition for a maximum (negative semi-definiteness of the Hessian matrix) is 
met, the second-order sufficient condition (negative definiteness) is not. Roughly speaking, the constrained 
objective function is "flat" in the vicinity of any optimum that may exist, and no conditions emerge from 
the PD analysis except the FOC and the symmetry of the second partials. This is in strong contrast to the 
richness of the results for the utility-maximization model, which has a constraint of much simpler form. 
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• It provides some results which, if not entirely new, are at least not evident in 
any of the standard textbook analyses of the model. In particular, the relation 
involving the cross-price effect and the own-price effects (above, p. 24) is 
important, and the symmetry relations from which it is derived, as well as the 
other relations which follow therefrom, are important in principle despite their 
dependence on the value of the Lagrange multiplier (the Marginal Utility of 
Money). The similar relations in the dual problem ( expenditure minimization), 
µp;* = 8µ*/8pi = Bh//8(!, and the relation between the compensated own-
price and cross-price effects (p. 28, quite different from that for the 
uncompensated effects) are also of at least theoretical importance. The version 
of Roy's identity for the case with prices in the utility function appears to be 
new as well, although it can be derived less directly using conventional 
methods. 
These results demonstrate the ability of the PD method to bring forth all of the 
relations which follow from the maximization hypothesis, including those which may be 
overlooked by conventional analysis. 
The banking model probably should also be viewed more as an exercise than as a 
contribution to banking theory. One common criterion for judging the usefulness of a 
model is whether it captures significant features of the phenomenon modeled. Certain 
features of the nature of banking are clearly inherent in the model while others are not. 
On the other hand, this is true for most elementary textbook models, and perhaps more so 
for the banking industry than for some others. The model predicts that the profit-
maximizing value of loans increases and that of deposits decreases when the rates on 
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those variables increase, in agreement with intuition at least. Similarly, the result 
corresponding to Roy's Identity says that increases in the bank's net worth and in the 
reserve ratio have opposite effects on its bottom line. 
The other Roy-like relations (p. 37) provide testable hypotheses which accord 
with intuition if the Lagrange multiplier is positive, which is "almost certainly" the case.3 
The symmetry relations, 6 in number, make firm predictions about the behavior of the 
quantities of loans and deposits in response to changes in the various parameters, but all 
but one involve derivatives of the multiplier with respect to the parameters. While PD 
analysis has nothing to say about the signs of these CS derivatives, they can be shown by 
conventional analysis to depend on the shape of the cost function, in particular upon its 
second derivatives with respect to loans and deposits. If these derivatives are determined 
empirically or by assumption, all 6 of these relations become testable hypotheses. 
The primal problem also generates two other testable hypotheses. One states that 
deposits must decrease in response to an increase in either net worth or reserve ratio or 
both, which is not trivial since conventional analysis cannot determine the sign of 
8D*lfJq. The other states that the products of the magnitudes of the "own-rate effects" 
(the response ofloans to an increase in the rate on loans, and the same for deposits) is 
greater than or equal to the product of the magnitudes of the "cross-rate effects." Both of 
these relations involve only observable quantities and so are definitely testable. 
The generalized Slutsky relations are very interesting. Assuming that the value of 
the response of the bank's costs to a change in either loans or deposits can be determined, 
they can be computed numerically. They would then make firm predictions about 
3 See discussion on p. 36, above. 
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"compensated" values of loans and deposits, the way that the bank would adjust the 
values of these variables if its net worth were adjusted to keep profits at the same level. 
This is of at least theoretical interest. 
Finally, while it is impossible to determine the sign of 8D*/8q, PD analysis shows 
(and conventional analysis confirms) that 8Dc/8q ::5; 0. While compensated values of loans 
and deposits would be difficult to observe (less so, perhaps, than compensated demand), 
this prediction too is significant if the concept is considered meaningful at all. 
Remarkably, it appears that the comparative-statics properties of this rudimentary 
limit pricing model have not previously been explored. While early writers (Bain, 
Modigliani, Sylos-Labini) were concerned with the broader questions of barriers to entry 
in general, and about the circumstances in which various possible strategic actions might 
be plausible, most writers after Dixit, and especially after Milgrom and Roberts, were 
concerned primarily with the strategic aspects and outcomes of the game itself. 
Given the familiarity of the principle involved, the main results proved for this 
model are unsurprising. But the remaining limited results are almost certainly incomplete, 
and it is anticipated that further work, especially with regard to the dual problem and the 
Slutsky relation, will uncover additional testable and meaningful predictions. The entire 
area of limit pricing remains an open question, and the fact that more complex behavior is 
possible and almost certainly does occur does not rule out the possibility of simpler 
behavior of the very sort envisioned by Bain over 50 years ago. 
Comparative statics appears to many upon first encountering it to be a complex 
and arcane procedure. A little experience with standard models soon dispels this 
impression and makes it appear simple, routine, cut-and-dried. The former impression 
84 
may actually be more accurate when considering the more complex models encountered 
in modem applications. While many linear models with two or three choice variables and 
a similar number of parameters still lend important insights, modem research models 
commonly include uncertainty, multiple periods, and game-theoretic aspe.cts. If such 
effects are difficult to model, the models they generate can be extremely daunting to 
analyze. 
It is with these more complex models that Primal-Dual method provides 
significant advantages. In essence, it pre-calculates the general forms of the testable 
relations that are available from an optimization model, independently from any 
assumptions upon the character of the functions involved; and it provides an organized 
system for deriving their specific forms for a particular model. In contrast, the 
conventional method reinvents the wheel not just for each problem but for each 
combination of variable and parameter in a given problem, incurring the expense of much 
tedious, repetitive, and error-prone calculation. Careful use of PD method also assures 
that all the fundamental results will be found, and it separates results that depend on 
assumptions regarding the shape of the functions involved or their derivatives from those 
that are not thus dependent 
The price paid for these advantages is that effective use of PD method, even in 
relatively simple problems, requires a thorough understanding of concepts of duality and 
of concavity/convexity, fluent mastery of the subtleties of multivariate calculus, and of 
course, practice. This is a considerably greater investment in the techniques of analytical 
mathematics than is required by conventional comparative-statics methods, which 
normally require nothing more than partial differentials and Cramer's Rule. Furthermore, 
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despite the power inherent in the PD method, skill, insight, and perseverance are still 
necessary in order to derive results which are meaningful and useful. 
The emphasis in economic education today is on statistical methods, themselves 
arcane and specialized, and on iterative techniques such as mathematical programming 
and numerical approximation which, like statistical analysis, are necessarily implemented 
by computer. Such tools are essential to address the increasing variety of questions which 
economists are called upon to answer. Programming methods, for example, were 
developed specifically to determine the values of the independent variables in real-world 
optimization problems too complex for practical solution by traditional methods of the 
calculus. Statistical methods, on the other hand, can be seen as complementary to 
comparative statics (as well as to comparative dynamics, an increasingly important field 
of investigation), in that it is the latter that is the source of the hypotheses which 
statistical studies are called upon to test. Despite the additional educational burden in the 
specialized mathematical methods involved, Primal-Dual method appears to be the 
appropriate tool, if not the only practical one, for generate testable hypotheses for the 
more complex models encountered today 
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